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1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the needs of power systems and the instruments used to meet those 
needs. It builds a framework for classifying the needs and also the instruments. The ultimate 
goal behind this is to identify the best away to arrange a power market. However, in order 
to be able to give any answers to that question, it is first necessary to build the framework. 
This is because based on an extensive literature review and several expert interviews, no 
such frameworks were found. Thus, this thesis concentrates on building one and hopes to 
use it to draw some conclusions as to the organization of the power market, especially the 
ancillary and capacity markets.   
This thesis starts with a look at what were the drawbacks with the vertically integrated 
power sector that lead to the creation of the liberalised energy-only market. The same 
chapter two also looks at what is, or at least should be, better with the liberalised market, 
and what its challenges are, as well as what tasks it performs. 
The third chapter explains why the energy-only trade needs to be supplemented in order to 
keep the power system functioning, why the liberalised power market alone is not enough 
for the second to second operation of the power system. The chapter presents the needs 
that the energy-only trade cannot meet and determines that these arise from three levels: 
the physical operation, the network, and the policy level.  
The fourth chapter gives some answers to how to meet these needs, what instruments can 
be used to meet them and introduces a framework for classifying the instruments. These 
instruments or services are referred to as ancillary services, and for the purposes of this 
thesis they are divided into four categories: frequency control, capacity, coordination and 
operation, and finally system backup and restoration.  
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The fifth chapter presents a case study of the frequency control and capacity instruments in 
the Danish system. The sixth chapter includes shorter cases on Poland and Pennsylvania-
Jersey-Maryland (PJM) in the United States. The purpose of these cases is to see how the 
developed framework works in the context of real countries as well to identify the 
dimensions on which the instruments differ in the different countries, or which have to be 
known to define and buy the service in question. In other words, to identify the dimensions 
that players wishing to enter the markets in question need to know. The same chapter also 
includes some general points on what leads to the opening of ancillary and capacity 
markets, and some examples of ways to organize the capacity market.  
Next, the findings chapter summarises the main facts found out during the research, 
including some points on what should be taken into consideration when designing market 
instruments into a system, what are the essential questions to answer before implementing 
an instrument. The conclusions chapter draws it all together, and the discussion chapter 
looks into what went well, what could have been done better, and what there is left to 
study.  
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2 Energy-only trade; its birth and functions 
Traditionally, vertically integrated and regulated utilities had taken care of generation, 
transmission, as well as distribution. This model was based on four principles formed early 
in the 20th century, at the start of wider electrification. The first of these was that when 
customers were aggregated to form the largest possible interconnected web, i.e. grid, it was 
cheaper to serve them. Secondly, the economies of scale in the electricity industry meant 
that monopolies were deemed natural. Third, because costs went down as sales went up, 
the dominant marketing logic became to “sell more and charge less”. This meant that 
consumers were encouraged to consume more power. Fourth, because the electricity 
industry had decreasing costs, large needs for capital, and strong “political interaction”, a 
system of governmental regulation was set up to control and stabilize it. [Fox-Penner, 2010] 
However, in the 1990s, many countries started to deregulate their electricity sectors and 
disintegrate their utilities. Generation was separated to form a competitive market of its 
own. For example in the US and also many other countries this was possible because 
transmission networks had developed far enough to make significant trade over long 
distances possible and “to remove the natural monopoly character of the wholesale market 
in many places”. [Stoft, 2002] In completely competitive markets, also transmission and 
distribution are unbundled, customers can choose between several suppliers, and ancillary 
services have their own market. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
One of the needs for competition came from the fact that in the older model of regulated 
markets there always existed a trade-off between keeping electricity prices low and 
minimising costs. This is because suppliers of electricity will almost always have more and 
better knowledge about the market than regulators. For example with a regulatory scheme 
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where suppliers are allowed to recover their costs and a normal rate of return on their 
investment, but nothing more, prices will be low, but there will be no incentive to decrease 
costs. This is because if a supplier finds a way to cut costs by a certain amount, this will be 
taken away and given to customers. Another example is a regulatory scheme with price caps 
fixed according to some formula for a long time period. In such a scheme, producers do get 
to keep all the money they save, but as any formula for price caps that is fixed for a long 
period of time must allow for prices to be clearly above long-run costs, it will lead to prices 
being excessively high. [Stoft, 2002]  
This trade-off can be softened and even made relatively satisfactory by increasing the 
regulators’ knowledge. Still, it is always going to exist in regulated markets and the result is 
never going to be the same as in competitive deregulated ones, which can encourage both 
holding prices near marginal costs and minimisation of costs. Additionally, competitive 
markets also tend to produce pricing that more accurately reflects production costs through 
the use of real-time pricing. This real-time pricing should also decrease consumption during 
times when the prices of electricity are highest and generation most expensive. In theory, 
this in turn means that less capacity needs to be built and that thus the total cost of 
generating electricity will be lower too. This reduction in costs is however counteracted by 
the additional costs to the customers of having to shift their consumption, so that the net 
benefit often is just a few percent.  [Stoft, 2002] 
Although deregulated markets usually are more efficient than regulated ones, in reality they 
have their problems as well. The first major issue is that at present there is little to no real-
time metering in use, and very few customers see the real-time prices, meaning that 
responsiveness to price changes is very small, and demand essentially inelastic. The second 
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problem comes from the fact that it is not possible to control the flow of power to particular 
customers in real time, which means that “bilateral contracts cannot be physically enforced 
in real time”. It also means that the system operator has to function as the real time default 
supplier. Due to the negligible responsiveness of demand to price changes, it is possible that 
the demand and supply curves fail to intersect. At such times, competitive pricing is 
impossible, and the system operator has to set the price for electricity. These two “flaws” 
on the demand-side produce high prices, and together with scarcity, create ideal conditions 
for use of market power to increase prices even more. [Stoft, 2002] 
Another major shortcoming of the deregulated energy-only market is that it is unable to 
guarantee capacity adequacy on its own. The average market price does generally not 
reflect the true value of lost load, or energy not being delivered, and yet this price is what 
guides investments. This means that investing in capacity is not profitable, and thus the 
market will most likely not encourage adequate investment. For the market to be able to do 
this, the prices during the peak hours would have to be unreasonably high, resulting in high 
risks for both consumers and producers. [Zhao, 2010] 
Additional issues with deregulation arise from complexity and local market power. 
Complexity here means that the power system is often very large, yet at the same time 
quite delicate. This means that every generator has to synchronized with all the others, 
voltage has to be kept at a certain level in a large number of different locations. And the 
network where these goals must be reached is effectively split into two parts: the grid part 
that is operated “for the common good” and the generators that are operated for 
“hundreds of different private interests”. While this complexity may be overcome through 
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well thought-out market rules, the issue of local market power often requires regulatory 
intervention. [Stoft, 2002] 
Even with these flaws and issues, it remains possible to design a market that works well. It is 
just essential to notice that the biggest issues with deregulating markets are to do with the 
market structure, not so much the market architecture. The term market structure refers to 
the technology and ownership properties of a market, with supplier concentration and 
elasticity of demand being the most common measures for the competitiveness of the 
structure. Market architecture, on the other hand, refers to the submarkets, parts of the 
larger market that are also markets, found on a market and the links between them. After 
grasping this difference, the problems with deregulating can be tackled, and quite good 
solutions can be found. The long term goal should of course be for demand to become 
elastic enough to “clear the market at a finite price”, with price spikes that do not need 
caps. Indeed, when deregulating any power market, it has been suggested that it might be 
cheapest to first fix the demand side before creating any market structure. [Stoft, 2002] 
Many different forms of competitive power markets exist these days, with the simplest 
being the pure energy market, where only electricity is traded. The market in the Nordic 
countries has been of this type since 1998, and also the Australian market is like this. On 
energy-only markets, the prices for electricity for every hour of the following day are 
determined through daily evaluation of supply and demand curves on a spot market. The 
supply and demand curves themselves are based on offers to supply, which in turn are 
based on the variable costs of generators, and forecasts of demand by the customers. In the 
Nordic countries, and also in Germany, there is an additional market for intra-day trading 
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that can go on until one hour before the need for electricity actualises. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
[Fingrid.fi] 
The energy-only market fulfils several needs. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, it 
matches supply to demand, providing market clearance. Second, it allows power producers 
to recover their production costs, and hopefully also make a profit, thus enabling them to 
continue producing power. Third, the balance of supply and demand achieved through the 
energy-only market functions as the basis for dispatch planning. 
Today the electricity industry faces totally different challenges from anything that has come 
before, and the principles on which electricity systems were built during the early 20th 
century are becoming at least partly obsolete. The first major global issue is the need to 
mitigate climate change, to limit greenhouse gas concentrations to acceptable levels. It is 
generally accepted that much greater energy efficiency is both the best and the cheapest 
way to do this, but it goes directly against the old maxim of selling as much electricity as 
possible as cheaply as possible and is going to require big changes to the core ideas of the 
power industry.  [Fox-Penner, 2010]  
The second issue to be addressed is the need for more energy security and economic 
stability. Many countries are already dependent on oil and natural gas imports from 
countries such as Saudi-Arabia, Iran, and Russia, and with increasing global demand these 
supplier countries are going to have more and more “geographical leverage”. Solving this 
issue is going to mean shifts in fuel sources, generation, and often also the building of new 
transmission capacity. [Fox-Penner, 2010] 
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It has been suggested that during the next decades, power systems will change from ones 
based on large sources and central control to ones with many smaller sources and individual 
control. Also the economies of scale involved in power production have already changed 
and will continue to. The goal of maximum consumption has already been replaced by the 
ones of productivity and sustainability, and old forms of regulation will become useless. The 
three new objectives of the power industry will be the creation of a “decentralised control 
paradigm, retooling the system for low-carbon supplies”, as well as discovering business 
models to promote greater efficiency. [Fox-Penner, 2010] 
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3 The need for something additional – why energy-only trade alone is not 
enough 
The deregulated energy-only market alone is enough for neither the minute-to-minute 
operation of a power system, nor for the long term, there are needs that it cannot fulfil, and 
they are discussed in this chapter. These needs arise from three different levels; the physical 
operation level, the network level, and the policy level. While all three levels ultimately are 
inextricably linked to the physical operation of the system, the difference between them is 
in the scope of focus. The needs that come from the policy level are concerned for example 
with the benefit of the whole society or country, while the network level considers the grid 
as a whole, and the physical operation level concentrates on specific, momentary actions.  
3.1 Physical operation level 
3.1.1 Frequency stability  
In order to keep the power system secure, a continuous real-time balance between supply 
and consumption of electricity must be maintained. Disturbances in the balance between 
generation and load cause the system frequency to deviate from its target value. This 
frequency deviation can affect the operation of electrical equipment, power plants, and 
even at worst lead to a total system black-out.  Thus, imbalances must be dealt with 
immediately. [Katholieke Universiteit, 2009] [Verhaegen et al. 2006] 
There are three usual causes for these imbalances between supply and demand; predictable 
load variations throughout the day, unpredictable fluctuations in loads and generation, and 
outages of lines and generators. [Stoft, 2002] With current goals to increase the percentage 
of wind generation significantly in many countries, imbalances due to variability in 
production are going to increase in the future. True, when considering the total supply at 
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the European level, it is not that big of a deal when the wind stops at one wind farm, as it 
will likely blow at another, but especially in systems where a large part of the demand is met 
through wind, the variability does affect system operation. [Van Hulle et al, 2010] 
Trading on electricity markets produces consumption and production profiles that are 
broadly in balance within a certain time period. However, this is not enough for actual, 
physical system operation, where supply and demand must be in balance second by second 
in all locations of the network. [Verhaegen et al. 2006] 
Refining the result of trade is usually the responsibility of the system operators. They 
accomplish this by obtaining incremental generation and redispatching. For this reason, the 
power system needs to have reserve production capacity, and due to the limits in the 
transmission capacity of any system, this reserve must likely be distributed throughout it. 
[Verhaegen et al. 2006] 
Usually the system operators use several types of reserves. Fast responding reserves are 
used for short term issues, to avoid too big disturbances if supply or demand fails t o 
operate according to plan and to allow others to continue producing and consuming, while 
longer term reserves replace these after the immediate imbalance has been dealt with.  The 
definitions and treatment of the different reserves vary quite a lot from country to country, 
but in general they can be divided into primary, secondary, as well as tertiary control 
(regulation). The procurement and settlement of these different reserves can together be 
called balancing.  [Verhaegen et al. 2006] 
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3.1.2 Voltage stability for customers 
When electricity flows towards customers on the transmission lines, voltage drops on the 
way. If the voltage is not restored to the right level, it will affect all other loads in the area. A 
transformer usually corrects the voltage drop before distribution of power, but not entirely, 
which causes the voltage received by the customer to fluctuate. [Stoft, 2002] 
By using generators, capacitors or synchronous condenser to inject real power into the grid, 
the drop in voltage can be compensated. Generating reactive power consumes very little 
fuel, so essentially a generator’s only cost of producing it is the opportunity cost of a 
lowered ability to produce real power. Stabilising the voltage that customers receive 
interacts in a complex manner with the voltage limit set by transmission security explained 
below, and thus they should be considered together. [Stoft, 2002] 
As there are externalities associated with the consumption of reactive power, setting up a 
bilateral market for it not feasible due to the fact that consumers of reactive power would 
buy too little of it. Additionally, the losses associated with transmission of reactive power 
are large compared to the transmission of real power.  [Stoft, 2002] 
3.1.3 Ensuring power quality 
Broadly defined, power quality “refers to a wide variety of electromagnetic phenomena that 
characterize the voltage and current at a given time and at a given location on the power 
system”. The main phenomena causing disturbances to power quality include transients, 
short and long duration root-mean-square variations, imbalances, waveform distortions, as 
well as voltage fluctuations and power frequency variations.  [IEEE, 2009] 
Poor power quality disturbs power metering, can damage electrical equipment, and cause 
disruptions and malfunctions in process operations. These disruptions to profit-based 
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operations are costly, as are the possible equipment damage and repairs. Thus, the ultimate 
reason for monitoring power quality is economic.  [IEEE, 2009] 
Power quality can be monitored by the utility, end user, or a third party. Instruments used 
for monitoring power quality can be as simple as analogue voltmeters or as sophisticated 
and complex as “multiple-site, permanently installed power quality monitoring systems”. 
The type of instrument chosen depends on the objectives of the application.  [IEEE, 2009]  
Power quality can be corrected using many different methods. For example, load equipment 
can be designed to reduce harmonics in the load current, as well as to reduce sensitivity of 
loads to voltage disturbances. Also the supply system can be designed in a manner that 
reduces the possibility of disturbances, filters and compensators can be installed to correct 
the disturbances, and uninterruptible power sources can be installed to perform as the 
power source during disturbances in the utility power. [Kusko et al, 2007] 
3.2 Network level 
3.2.1 Transmission security in the national grid 
To make the transmission of electricity secure, a system operator has to calculate the 
security limits for the transmission lines, i.e. the thermal limit and basic physical limits. Then 
he has to make sure that the output of generators, given the load at the moment, does not 
exceed the security limit of any line.  The thermal limit is the total amount of real and 
reactive power a transmission line can handle before it is permanently damaged. Also 
voltage limits and stability limits, which are basic physical limits and vary more than thermal 
limits, may have to be taken into consideration when calculating security limits. [Stoft, 2002] 
A guiding principle in transmission security is that the loss or failure of any single 
component must not jeopardize the operation of the whole grid. So, if for example the 
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largest power plant in the system fails to operate, the system must be able to produce the 
missing electricity by some other means. The same goes for transmission lines.  
Transmission security service has to be provided by the system operator either through 
selling of transmission rights or controlling of the bids accepted in the day-ahead market. 
Both of these actions are done some time before real time, and thus in the time interval left 
in between, the flow of power can alter and breach a security limit, for example through an 
increase or decrease in load or a line or generator going out of service. [Stoft, 2002] 
If a security limit is breached in real time, the system operator induces more generation in 
one place and less in another. The issue, in other words, is not total generation, but the 
location of the generation. Although a market could take care of decreasing the price of 
electricity where less of it is wanted, and increasing it where more is needed, this market 
should only be an additional tool for the system operator to use. This is because the 
provision of transmission security is a very complex issue, and should be handled centrally. 
[Stoft, 2002] 
3.2.2 Transmission security in cross border transmission 
In the European electricity markets, there are considerable differences in electricity prices 
between countries. These differences are simply the result of production cost “gaps” 
between countries that rely on different primary power production technologies. Of course 
there can also be differences in prices between countries for other reasons, for example 
different pricing policies, taxation, fuel prices, or cost efficiency of production. Due to the 
price differences, power exchanges between interconnected partners have been growing, 
and this together with limited existing cross border exchange capacity has made the issue of 
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“cross border interchange and of exchange capacity allocation” increasingly important. 
[Genesi et el, 2008][Lamponen et al, 2007] 
3.2.3 Economic dispatch 
Economic dispatch means minimising the total cost of producing electricity by using the 
least costly generation at any time. The two issues that must be dealt with in economic 
dispatch are which plants to start up, and how much to use each. The day-ahead market is 
an important part of making real time dispatch efficient, as many generators are time-
consuming and costly to start up. [Stoft, 2002] 
Economic dispatch can be provided through bilateral trading, a centralized day-ahead power 
market, or power pool. Whereas in the first option suppliers of power and power traders 
solve the economic dispatch problem, in the second the exchange gives a public price that is 
used for deciding which generators to start up. The third option requires sending of complex 
bids, which the system operator then optimises. What all three options have in common is 
that in all of them the market price and the suppliers together decide on the dispatch. With 
a competitive market, the result should be quite close to least cost. [Stoft, 2002] 
3.2.4 Imbalance settlement  
Imbalance settlement consists of recording the differences between forecast demand or 
supply and actual consumption or generation, and then also charging for these differences. 
Ideally, there would be no difference but in reality this almost never is the case, as forecasts 
usually contain errors. Imbalance settlement is a service for the system operator to provide, 
because no trader has either the incentive to do this for their own trades or the possibility 
to do it for others’. [Stoft, 2002][Fingrid.fi][Zhang et al, 2009] 
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3.2.5 Emergency services and reserves  
Emergency services are used to handle crisis situations, when regular regulation service is 
not enough to maintain the power system in balance. An example is a situation without 
enough offers to supply power. [Kiener, 2006] 
3.2.6 Starting up an islanded part of the grid  
While most outages can be repaired with the help of a neighbouring part of the grid, 
sometimes, for example with wider blackouts, there is no neighbour to help. At the same 
time, almost all generators have to have access to power from the grid to start producing it 
in turn. Thus, generators with the capability to start injecting active power to the grid 
without first receiving power from the grid are needed in case of bad system failures, and 
these are called black start reserves. [Stoft, 2002] [Kiener, 2006] [Feltes, 2008] [Kirby, 2010] 
3.3 Policy level 
3.3.1 Ensuring sufficient capacity in the long term 
Supply reliability is actually a two-part concept, which includes both security and adequacy 
of supply. Security of supply means the ability of the power system to tolerate disturbances, 
while adequacy refers to the ability to match the total electricity requirement of all 
consumers at all times. The security aspects that have been addressed above have a more 
short term focus. Adequacy, on the other hand, focuses on meeting demand and preventing 
shortages in the long term, taking into consideration the unpredictable variations in supply 
and demand, that power cannot be stored and the lengthy lead times for building new 
capacity. [Oren, 2000] An important aspect of supply reliability is that the system must be 
able to withstand the loss of any single component in it, even the largest one. This principle 
should guide the planning of the system as well.   
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In theory, on a competitive market with no entry barriers supply or capacity adequacy 
would be guaranteed through temporary price increases, which should encourage 
investment in new capacity. Also, during scarcity, the price should rise high enough for 
voluntary load-shedding to take place. Thus, unlike security, adequacy is a private good, 
with customers deciding what the adequate quantity is. [Oren, 2000][Zhao, 2010]   
In reality, however, markets don’t function quite like that. First, the real average price of 
electricity on the market is usually not the same thing as the value of lost load, or energy 
not being delivered. Yet the price that producers actually get, i.e. the market price, is what 
guides investments. Second, real-time demand is almost inelastic without smart grids, 
meaning that the electricity market is in practice a supply-side market. Additionally, even 
supply can only react up to the amount of available capacity.  
 
Figure 1 Supply and demand curves on the Nordpool spot market [Wind Energy the Facts, 
homepage] 
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Due to concerns of the supply-side domination on the market leading to supply-side 
manipulation and the fact that electricity is so critical to economies it is common for 
regulators to intervene, through for example imposing price caps on energy market prices. 
These caps are usually lower than the prices that would exist in the ideal market, resulting in 
loss of money for generators and distorting investment signals. The price that generators 
actually do receive does not fully reflect the value of lost load, or energy not being 
delivered. One solution to this problem is to create a capacity market, where the generators 
could redeem the “missing money” and also decrease the investment risk. [Zhao, 2010] 
Related to, and almost impossible to separate from, the financial aspect of the missing 
money is the physical, or engineering, aspect of capacity adequacy. The less-than-ideal 
markets result in the missing money issue, which in turn causes too little investment to take 
place, leading to a shortage of capacity. And vice versa, as the prices on the capacity market 
that have been capped  do not represent the actual value of reliability, the generators don’t 
receive the prices that they would on the ideal market, which results in the missing money. 
Thus, missing money and adequacy are in fact two sides of the same coin. [Zhao, 2010]  
3.3.2 Energy efficiency 
The flipside of capacity adequacy on the consumers’ side is energy efficiency. In essence, it 
means using less energy than before to get the same result, or in production of power using 
less fuel to produce to same amount of electricity. This is an idea that is mentioned in 
countless visions for future energy systems and also in many countries’ energy policies as a 
way forward to meet growing demand and tightening emission standards, as well as 
counteract dependency from imported fossil fuels at the same time. Energy efficiency is 
even often seen as the “best and cheapest means of reducing carbon emissions” [Fox-
Penner, 2010].  
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However, to be able to compare the cost-effectiveness of investment in new capacity or in 
energy efficiency would require present value calculations, as there is a significant 
difference between investing in new capacity or energy efficiency. When purchasing more 
energy efficient appliances or technologies, consumers have to pay 100 percent of the costs 
up front, before receiving any benefit. The benefits, or savings, are then realized over the 
lifespan of the equipment. In contrast, when a new power plant is built, consumers only pay 
for 1kWh at a time, no matter how expensive the plant was to build. And even if the energy 
efficiency investment would be better in terms of net present value, the problem is that 
people do not in general act on net present value calculations. [Fox-Penner, 2010]  
There are several other barriers to more wide scale adoption of energy efficiency measures 
that would pay for themselves over their lifetime. The first of these is that it takes effort and 
training to keep up with the features of energy use technologies and evaluate their cost 
savings potential, and most consumers just do not have the knowledge needed. Related to 
this is the fact that it is much easier to buy more power than to consider alterations to one’s 
home or office or factory. The second barrier is simply lack of available capital to finance the 
investments in energy efficiency, or unwillingness to use the scarce capital available to 
finance investments that take several years to pay themselves back and are not even 
directly related to the consumer’s own business. [Fox-Penner 2010] 
Yet another barrier to energy efficiency measures being adopted are the transaction costs 
involved in adopting them. Buying more power is simple, but energy efficiency measures 
require construction projects and changes to the way things are done. The fourth barrier is 
to do with the fact that most often decisions regarding a building’s energy use are made by 
someone like a landlord or builder who will not be paying the electricity bills. This means 
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that they may see no benefit in installing more energy efficient technology. Additionally, the 
price of power rarely reflects the true cost of providing it, which means that the real value 
of saving electricity cannot be seen by consumers. [Fox-Penner, 2010]  
Because of the human tendency to favour benefit today over benefit tomorrow, and the 
four hidden costs mentioned above it is likely that for energy efficiency to be utilised to its 
full potential some policies targeting these barriers will be necessary. There are several 
choices here, anything from adopting dynamic pricing that reflects the approximate cost of 
production for each hour, to including externalities in the power price to new building codes 
and energy efficiency standards, to offers of low-interest capital, to utilities helping with 
installing energy efficiency measures, to turning the responsibility over to the private firms 
that specialize in designing energy efficiency measures. [Fox-Penner, 2010]      
Whichever method chosen to promote it, more energy efficiency would mean that the 
demand curve shifts to the left, distancing the intersection of demand and supply from the 
area where the supply curve becomes vertical.  
3.3.3 Guiding the capacity mix 
In recent years, concerns have arisen in Europe about excessive reliance on fossil fuels. This 
is mainly due to three reasons. First, burning fossil fuels produces greenhouse gases and 
other emissions, contributing to climate change. Second, fossil fuels are mostly located 
away from where they are used and often in politically unstable regions, thus reducing 
security of energy supply. In addition, the prices of fossil fuels are already high and quite 
volatile, and as the fossil fuels become more and more scarce, these effects are probably 
going to increase. Accordingly, many countries have been led to consider guiding their 
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capacity mix toward a more independent one, for example through renewable and nuclear 
power. [Van Hulle et al, 2010] [Mendonça, 2007] 
3.3.4 Climate change mitigation 
Globally greenhouse gas emissions are growing together with the population and economic 
output of many countries. There are several greenhouse gases, with the most important 
ones being carbon dioxide, nitrous oxides, methane, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). When 
the concentrations of these gases increase in the atmosphere, they disturb the radiation 
energy balance of the earth by trapping energy into the atmosphere, instead of it being let 
into space. This warms the Earth. [VTT, 2009]  
Climate change poses a serious threat to ecosystems and human life. It leads to increased 
temperatures, higher sea levels, often also significantly different amounts of rainfall, which 
can in turn lead to floods and dry spells. Climate change can also impact the humidity of the 
soil in many places, and thereby agriculture in general, and food production in particular, as 
well as water availability. Due to climate change, also extreme weather conditions are likely 
to become more common. Of course, the size of these impacts will depend on how far 
climate change will proceed; whether the temperature rise stops at two or four or six 
degrees will make a great difference. [VTT, 2009] 
According to the largest study on the economic impact of climate change, the Stern report, 
the short run costs of climate change will be around 2.5 percent of GDP in Asia by 2100 and 
circa 2 percent in the Middle-East and Africa. The report estimates that the monetary costs 
will be lower in the Northern hemisphere. The long-run costs are estimated to significantly 
higher. However, the report estimates that the costs of mitigation will be considerably 
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lower. Therefore, in addition to the environmental impacts themselves, also the economic 
point of view encourages early action. [VTT, 2009] 
Mitigation of climate change is no easy task, as “the inertia of the total system is 
tremendous”. The socio-economic inertia comes from the long life-times of investments, as 
well as slow changing attitudes and policies. Nature itself also has inertia; greenhouse gases 
have long life-times in the atmosphere, and the heat capacity of the “natural surface-
atmosphere system is large”. Overcoming this inertia is no mean feat. Also, the reductions 
required to even stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations to a level that can be considered 
safe will require large emissions decreases; according to the IPCC for example CO2 
emissions should be cut by 50-85 % from 2000 levels by 2050 in order to limit temperature 
rise to about two degrees. And at present we don’t even know the precise relationship 
between radiative forcing and temperature increase, known as climate sensitivity. [VTT, 
2009] 
There are two principal ways to mitigate climate change. The first one is to reduce 
consumption or to at least change it to a direction with less emissions and lower energy 
intensity. The second way to cut emissions is to use technology better in both energy 
services and the generation of energy itself. In practice this means using more energy-
efficient technologies as well as ones with low to zero emissions. Carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) as well as control of other emissions like methane, NOx, and halocarbons also 
provide possibilities. Of course the consumption approach and technological approach can 
be coupled in order to produce truly lasting results. [VTT, 2009] 
Further, it is most likely only possible to make sufficient reductions in the world GHG 
emissions unless all “significant emitters” participate in the effort. This means that countries 
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with hugely different emissions per capita, development stages, and financial means have to 
be able to reach some kind of consensus on climate treaties. Both policy instruments, like 
regulation, standards, financing, as well as other fiscal measures, and economic instruments 
such as emission trading and feed-in tariffs, tax exemptions, and green certificates can be 
used to speed the mitigation effort along. [VTT, 2009] 
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4 Ancillary and system services 
As established in the previous chapter, power systems have needs beyond those that the 
energy-only market can meet. This chapter introduces the instruments used to meet those 
needs, called ancillary and system services, and introduces a framework for classifying them. 
Technically system and ancillary services are two different things; system services are 
provided by a SO to all users of the network, while ancillary services are provided by some 
users to the SO. However, the two are also interconnected as the system operator often 
buys ancillary services to be able to supply system services in turn. [Rebours et al, Part I, 
2007] Thus, from now on they shall be referred to as ancillary services, although both are 
meant. 
Because the liberalisation of the electricity industry has proceeded independently in 
different countries and because the power systems in these countries have been very 
different from one another to begin with, also the definitions for ancillary services, as well 
as their trading differ significantly from one country to another. In fact, there is such a large 
amount of different terms when it comes to ancillary and system services, that when 
comparing power systems, extreme care is necessary and confusion seems almost 
inevitable. [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007]  
For the purposes of this thesis, the services are going to be divided into four categories; 
frequency control, capacity, coordination and operation, as well as system backup and 
restoration. The categories are used according to the article by Raineri et al, 2006, with the 
exception of the capacity category. Of these categories, frequency control and capacity will 
be examined further in the next chapters. There we will look at how the instruments in 
those categories are traded in the case areas of Denmark, Poland, and Pennsylvania-Jersey-
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Maryland in the United States (PJM). But in this chapter, all instruments are introduced 
briefly. First, a short description of the dispatcher mindset is provided. 
4.1 Dispatcher mindset 
The consumption and production profiles and their broad balance produced by the day-
ahead energy market, as well as a possible intra-day market form the basis for power 
dispatching. However, this broad balance is not enough for second to second system 
operation, and power dispatchers must refine it. During normal operation this is achieved 
through a combination of manual regulation and reserves that automatically respond to 
changes in frequency. [Verhaegen et al. 2006]   
If the automatic reserves are not enough to keep the frequency within prescribed limits, 
further manual regulation through a balancing power market is undertaken. This is a market 
where power producers and consumers can submit bids to supply regulation up or down. 
These bids are usually used in the order of prices. Such a market does not exist in every 
country, however, and in these countries the manual control is done using reserves set 
aside for it. [www.Fingrid.fi] 
If the disturbance in a system is so bad that even the balancing market or corresponding 
manual regulation is not enough to reinstate the balance, emergency procedures are used. 
These can include anything from requests for additional balancing bids, to orders to reduce 
consumption, to use of emergency reserves. [Kiener, 2006] 
Besides frequency control, also transmission security must be taken into account in 
dispatching. This means that the dispatcher has to make sure that the power flowing in the 
grid does not breach the security limits of transmission lines, and if it does, then he has to 
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induce less generation in that location and more in another. The issue, in other words, is not 
the total generation, but rather the location of the generation. [Stoft, 2002] 
 
Figure 2 Events in the energy-only market and the supporting markets with respect to one 
operating hour 
Figure 2 is intended to clarify how the events in the energy-only market and the supporting 
markets relate to one operation hour, to the physical operation of the system. The events 
before the hour are to prepare for the hour, during the hour the plans made in advance are 
implemented and any deviations from them are corrected using regulation and reserves. 
After the hour, all monetary settlements related to the hour are carried out.  
4.2 Frequency control and capacity 
4.2.1 Frequency control 
In order to keep the system frequency at its target level, the demand and generation must 
be kept in balance through controlling of production and consumption of power. This 
requires that a certain amount of active power reserves, or frequency control reserves, be 
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kept available in a power system. This reserve can usually be divided into three levels; 
primary, secondary, and tertiary. Figure 3 demonstrates the basic principle of power sytem 
balancing. Deployment times are the most important technical features of the frequency 
control services. [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007] These reserves are traded, whereas those used 
for system backup and restoration are usually not allowed to operate on the free market or 
any market. 
 
Figure 3 Principle of power system balancing [Van Hulle et al, 2010]   
4.2.1.1 Primary frequency control reserve 
Primary frequency control is local control that automatically adjusts the active power output 
of generators as well as the amount of consumption of controllable loads in order to 
reinstate balance between production and consumption of power and offset variations in 
frequency. In other words, it is used to deliver reserve power in the opposite direction of a 
frequency deviation. [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007] 
31 
 
Aside from being used to maintain the continuous balance in normal system operation 
together with manual adjustments, primary frequency control is also designed to stabilize 
frequency after large outages, and it is thus vital for the power system’s stable operation. 
“All the generators that are located in a synchronous zone and are fitted with a speed 
governor perform this control automatically.” Also loads can take part in this control by for 
example self-regulating or disconnecting. However, this demand-side contribution is not 
always included in calculating the primary frequency control response. [Rebours et al, Part I, 
2007] 
There are a couple of limitations to the provision of primary frequency control. First, many 
of the generators that increase their output upon a frequency drop can only maintain this 
higher output level for a given time. Thus, they must be replaced after a while. Another 
important point is that the primary reserve should be divided evenly throughout the 
network, in order to minimise unplanned electricity transmission across the system in case 
of outages and to improve security. [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007]   
4.2.1.2 Secondary frequency control reserve 
Whereas primary control limits and stops frequency deviations, secondary control brings the 
frequency back to its target level. Secondary control is automatic, centralised control that 
adjusts the active power output of generators so as to bring both frequency and 
interchanges with other systems to their intended values following a disturbance. Demand-
side participation is not common in secondary control. [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007] 
Secondary control is not vital to the operation of the power system, and thus some systems 
use only automatic primary control and manual tertiary control. However, all “large 
interconnected systems” have implemented also secondary control, as the manual tertiary 
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control isn’t capable of removing overloads on tie lines fast enough. In the (former) UCTE, 
secondary frequency control is known as load-frequency control (LFD), and in the USA the 
preferred term is automatic generation control (AGC). The term AGC in the UCTE, on the 
other hand, means both dispatching and secondary frequency control. [Rebours et al, Part I, 
2007]   
4.2.1.3 Tertiary frequency control reserve 
Manual changes in dispatching and unit-commitment are called tertiary control. It is used 
for restoring the primary and secondary reserves, for managing congestion in the network, 
as well as for returning the frequency and interchanges to the right levels, if secondary 
control has been unable to do this.  [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007]      
4.2.1.4 Demand response  
Demand response can be defined as end-customers changing their electricity consumption 
from the nominal level in response to price changes or incentives or dispatch orders. It is 
used to decrease demand at times when the price of electricity is high, or when reliability of 
the system is at risk. It can also be used to induce more demand when electricity price is 
low. [Singh et al, 2010] [Mohagheghi et al, 2010] The programs for realising demand 
response can be divided into three groups, based on where the initiative for the demand 
response comes from. [Mohagheghi et al, 2010] 
Closely related to demand response is load shedding, also called demand side or load side 
management. It consists of disconnecting parts of the distribution network when the power 
demand exceeds the maximum possible generation. For example in many developing 
countries it is common practice to have rotating regular periods or even times of day when 
power is not available.  
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Incentive based programs 
In incentive based DR programs, a utility or other instance responsible for demand 
response, often called an aggregator, sends out either request or commands for demand 
reduction to the participating customers. Both directly controllable loads and loads that can 
be interrupted or reduced when they receive a signal can be used in these types of 
programs. Typical applications for the direct control are residential appliances or other 
residential loads. The loads that can be interrupted or reduced are usually larger, for 
example lighting, air conditioning, or heating and cooling in industrial processes as well as 
process scheduling. The notification time for demand response of this type can vary 
between some minutes to a couple of hours. [Mohagheghi et al, 2010] 
Rate based programs 
In rate based demand response, the price of electricity is changed either at intervals 
determined beforehand or dynamically, based on the time of day or week or year and the 
amount of currently available reserve margin. The idea is for the price of electricity to be 
highest during peak times and lowest off-peak, and for customers to voluntarily respond to 
the price changes. “The prices can be set a day in advance on a daily or hourly basis, or in 
real-time.” [Mohagheghi et al, 2010] 
Demand reduction bids 
Demand reduction bids are sent by the participating customers to the utility or aggregator, 
at the customers’ own initiative. In these bids the customers announce how much demand 
reduction capacity they have, as well as the price they want for it. “This program encourages 
mainly large customers to provide load reductions at prices for which they are willing to be 
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curtailed, or to identify how much load they are willing to curtail at the posted price.” 
[Mohagheghi et al, 2010] 
4.2.2 Capacity  
4.2.2.1 Approaches to ensuring adequacy of capacity 
The traditional vertically integrated utilities used to ensure adequacy of supply by 
considering forecasts of demand and estimates of the value of lost load (VOLL), and then 
building extra planning reserves based on these. The cost of this capacity was covered by a 
rate increase. Nowadays, many electricity markets have been restructured and there are 
three newer basic methods to ensuring adequacy. [Oren, 2000] 
Energy only markets 
In energy only markets, generators bid purely energy prices and if there are no constraints, 
all their bids that are lower than the market-clearing price of the current hour get 
dispatched and paid the market-clearing price. Capacity cost is recovered mainly through 
the difference between the market-clearing price and the marginal cost of the generator. An 
additional source of revenue can come from possible separated ancillary markets. [Oren, 
2000] 
Capacity payments 
In a system where capacity payments are in use, generators receive the normal market-
clearing price, but also an additional per MW payment for available capacity, regardless of 
whether that capacity is actually dispatched or not. This additional payment can also be 
based on generated energy. These capacity payments are collected from customers like 
other “uplift charges”, such as the transmission charge. “In some cases such as in Spain 
capacity payments are indistinguishable from stranded investment compensation, which are 
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viewed as an additional source of revenue for the generators that is needed in addition to 
the competitive energy revenues in order to guarantee their profitability.” [Oren, 2000]  
Planning reserves requirement 
The third approach to guaranteeing generation adequacy is in use in the eastern pools of 
the United States, for example PJM, NYPP, and New England. In these systems, “load serving 
entities” must either have or contract a prescribed amount of reserve capacity above their 
peak demand within a certain time period. What form this reserve requirement has and 
what the time frame is varies from system to system. [Oren, 2000] 
Where reserve capacity requirements have been implemented, capacity markets to allow 
the trading of the capacity obligations have often emerged. The capacity markets together 
with the reserve requirement give generators the possibility of making additional revenue 
for their unutilized reserve capacity and also give an incentive to invest in reserves beyond 
what is required in the short term for ancillary services. [Oren, 2000] 
The product on capacity markets can be defined as a certain amount of capacity being 
available at a certain place when requested within a certain reliability. [Zhao, 2010] 
4.2.2.2 Support instruments for renewable power 
Although renewable energy sources can potentially deliver many benefits, their market 
development has been relatively slow due to barriers in the existing market structures of 
countries. Examples of these barriers are public subsidies to fossil and nuclear power, 
coupled with no evaluations of their costs in the future, resistance from existing utilities not 
wanting new competition, governments preferring big, centralized power production 
solutions, as well as perceived investment risk and uncertainty. Other barriers are the often 
high costs of developing renewable power, difficulties in finding a “stable market” for the 
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generated power, and costs like environmental impact analyses, consent hearings, etc. 
[Mendonça, 2007] [Barry et al, 2009] 
To overcome these and other barriers to renewables development, many countries are 
adopting policies to support renewables. The main policy types in use globally are feed-in 
tariffs and quantity-based systems. Also other mechanisms like investment subsidies and tax 
instruments are used.  
Feed-in tariffs 
A feed-in tariff is a guarantee to producers of renewable power that their output will be 
bought, and at a predetermined price independent of the current market price. This 
guarantee price is designed to ensure that the renewable investment will be profitable, and 
is usually only in use for a certain time period; long enough to guarantee adequate profit 
and an acceptable level of risk for the investment. [Mendonça, 2007] [Barry et al, 2009] 
Quantity-based systems 
Quantity-based systems use governmental quotas or targets to guarantee market share for 
renewable power, thus ensuring that a certain minimum amount of it is produced. 
Internationally, quantity-based systems are about as popular as feed-in tariffs, at least in 
supporting wind generation. However, quantity-based systems tend to encourage the 
selection of least cost projects and for example in wind generation that means large scale 
wind farms in places with the best resources. At promoting small-scale generation they are 
less effective.  Also, quantity-based systems are not well suited to small investors, as both 
the transaction costs and investment risk are quite high under these schemes. The risk 
comes from the fluctuation in power prices and “the need to negotiate power purchase 
agreements with utilities”.  [Barry et al, 2009] 
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An example of quantity based methods is green certificates, which are widely used in for 
example in Europe. Green certificates are given as proof that a certain amount of electricity 
has been produced using renewable sources. A power producer gets as many certificates as 
he has produced renewable power; one certificate for every megawatt hour. Green 
certificates are a market-based method for supporting renewable power. With the 
certificates, energy sale and environmental values represented by the certificates have been 
separated and are sold on different markets.  [Motiva website] 
Investment subsidies and tax instruments 
Investment subsidies are government help in paying for the initial investment costs of 
renewable power. They are attractive in particular to smaller developers with limited 
financing of their own, and they are also one of the most popular support mechanisms 
globally. Their size varies from country to country, for example in 2005 in Finland 30% was 
common for wind, and in Sweden it varied between 15 to 35%.  [Barry et al, 2009] 
Tax instruments in many forms can also be used to support renewables. Examples are tax 
credits, exemptions, accelerated depreciation, and carbon taxes. Accelerated depreciation 
has been used successfully in promoting small-scale wind generation; in Sweden and 
Denmark one of the main reasons that individual farmers started to build turbines on their 
land was the introduction of accelerated depreciation rate of 30%. [Barry et al, 2009] 
Easing the consents process 
Yet another way of encouraging more renewable generation is to “streamline” the process 
of obtaining the required consents; to lower the costs and the amount of time associated 
with it. This can e.g. mean making small-scale projects exempt from environmental impact 
analyses. [Barry et al, 2009] 
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Other instruments 
Emission trading systems can aid in promoting renewable power, but usually they are not 
the primary source of support for it. They may make thermal generation relatively more 
expensive than renewable, but emission trading systems do not remove the issue of “finding 
a stable and economic market for the electricity generated; i.e. power purchase agreements 
will still need to be negotiated with retailers or large energy users”. Additionally, the carbon 
price in for example the EU emission trading scheme is volatile, meaning that it may not 
provide a reliable incentive for investment. [Barry et al, 2009] 
4.2.2.3 Emission trading 
The Kyoto Protocol from 2002 set specific greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 
each participating country. The countries can participate in emission trading, which is the 
buying and selling of part of their emission allowances, in order to reduce their costs of 
meeting their targets. If a country’s emissions are below its allowed annual amount, it can 
sell the excess and get profit from it. Emission trading transactions, according to the Kyoto 
Protocol, can take place on four levels: international, national, industry, and project level. 
[Kurkovsky, 2006] 
Emission trading schemes had been in place already before the Kyoto Protocol, so it is not a 
totally new concept. The systems are usually implemented either based on credits or on 
allowances. [Kurkovsky, 2006] 
4.3 Other instruments 
4.3.1 Coordination and operation 
4.3.1.1 Voltage control through injection and absorption of reactive power 
Maintaining the correct voltage in the grid is achieved by injecting or absorbing reactive 
power. [Kirby, 2010] Voltage control, like frequency control, is often divided into three 
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parts. Primary voltage control is automatic and keeps the voltage at a certain point, 
secondary voltage control is also automatic, but it “coordinates the actions of local 
regulators in order to manage the injection of reactive power within a regional voltage 
zone”. Tertiary voltage control is the manual optimising of the flow of reactive power in the 
network. Power producers may also wish to divide the voltage control into the basic part 
that they have to do in order to be a part of the grid and to the enhanced part that is not 
mandatory. Unlike for frequency control, the terminology for voltage control is quite unified 
across countries. [Rebours et al, Part I, 2007]   
4.3.1.2 Imbalance settlement 
How imbalance settlement is handled in a country or region depends on the market and 
network structures. For example in the UK, “cash-out prices” are determined for every hour 
of the day, and these are used to settle the imbalances between actual and contracted 
consumption and generation. In Austria, something called balance groups are used. Each 
group has a representative who is commercially responsible for the group and also manages 
and represents the group. [Zhang et al, 2009] 
4.3.1.3 Nodal Marginal Pricing (NMP) 
In Nodal Marginal Pricing, there is a different electricity price at every node in the power 
system. It is sometimes referred to as the “ideal pricing system”, because it can be used to 
produce a dispatch that takes the physical laws of transmission as well as the resulting limits 
and losses into consideration, unlike uniform pricing over the entire grid or even zonal 
pricing. On the other hand, it has been critiqued on the large number of prices being 
confusing. This criticism has led to some resistance in adopting it, as the large number of 
prices means that it is, among other things, harder to trace why an offer is not accepted, 
and also more complicated data handling and financial settlements. [Ding & Fuller, 2005] 
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4.3.1.4 Cross border transmission capacity allocation 
There are many different ways of allocating cross border transmission capacity. These 
include auctioning, market coupling, and unifying the electricity markets of neighbouring 
countries. “Coordinated auctioning” was the method suggested by the European 
Transmission System Operators (ETSO) in 2001. This explicit auctioning of cross border 
exchange capacities has the advantage of being able to take the differences in the 
organisation of national markets as well as the structure of the larger grid formed by the 
national ones into consideration. Later, ETSO suggested an implicit auctioning approach, 
called “Decentralised Market Coupling”, which essentially consists of decentralised national 
power markets and a centralised market for the cross border transmission capacities that 
regulates the interactions between these national markets. [Genesi et al, 2008] 
In market coupling, national markets are integrated and there are no explicit auctions for 
cross border transmission capacities. Instead, the capacities are assigned implicitly with the 
goal of maximising the combined economic surplus of everyone involved. [Genesi et al, 
2008] 
4.3.2 System backup and restoration 
4.3.2.1 Emergency services 
Emergency services are usually used according to a predetermined priority order. For 
example, the SO can first ask for new balancing offers, followed by orders to change 
generation output, asking for international help, disconnecting loads or lines, asking for 
emergency services that do not follow the usual technical requirements, and as a last resort 
using the emergency reserves that must be available to the SO at all times. For example if 
France, all of the technically available active power not being used for scheduled production 
has to be available for the SO to use as emergency reserve. [Kiener, 2006] 
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4.3.2.2 Black start capability 
These are generators with the ability to start up by themselves, without the grid or any 
other “off-site power”, and enough real as well as reactive power capacity to aid in either 
energising a part of the grid or starting other generators. Usually, several black start 
generators are used at the same time, in order to restore the system faster, and the 
“independent islands of generation and load” are then later synchronized. [Feltes, 2008] 
[Kirby, 2010] 
Most often, the generators used for black start are hydroelectric units, diesel generator sets, 
aero-derivative gas turbine generator sets, or larger gas turbines together with diesel 
generator sets.  [Feltes, 2008] 
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5 Frequency control and capacity instruments in Denmark 
Denmark is located in Northern Europe, and has circa 5.5 million inhabitants. In 2009, 
Denmark produced 34,290 GWh of electricity, and consumed 33,872 GWh. In the same 
year, the country’s exports of power came in at 10,930 GWh and imports at 11,264 GWh. 
The country is also a net exporter of oil, as well as of natural gas. [CIA, 2011][Energinet.dk] 
Circa 48 percent of the electricity in 2008 was produced from coal, 19 % from wind, another 
19% from gas, and 6 % from biomass, 5 from waste, and 3 from oil, and a very small amount 
from hydropower. Thus, the percentage of renewable generation in Denmark is quite high. 
[IEA.org]  
5.1 Structure of the Danish power market 
In Denmark, the power market has three separate parts; a day-ahead spot market, an intra-
day market, and a market for reserves and regulating power. There is also a balancing 
market, but this is not so much a market in the traditional sense as it is the basis for settling 
imbalances. The electricity market of Denmark is part of the common Nordic market, 
Nordpool. Nordpool is owned by the Nordic TSOs, and most of the wholesale power trade in 
Denmark goes through it. Nordpool has two parts: Elspot and Elbas. [Energinet.dk]  
Elspot is where the day-ahead spot trade takes place. It operates on an auction principle, 
where once a day a market price for each bidding area is formed by matching supply and 
purchase bids. Denmark is separated into two different bidding areas by the Great Belt. The 
auction mechanism used on Elspot is of implicit type, as transfer capacity is allocated at the 
same time as power is traded. In case of congestion, the market is split up into various price 
areas. [Energinet.dk] 
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Elbas is the market that market players can use for reaching a balance after the closing of 
Elspot. In Denmark, intraday trade is possible on all transmission interconnections to 
neighbour areas as well as on the Great Belt Power Link. This trade takes place on Elbas, 
where players can modify the result of trade reached on the Elspot market from after the 
closing of Elspot until one hour before delivery. [Energinet.dk][Nordpoolspot.com] 
The Jutland-Germany border differs from the other interconnections: intraday trade there 
takes place via a capacity platform. “On the capacity platform access to a transport channel 
is given; the access is necessary in order to be able to make use of the intraday trade. Buying 
and selling energy cannot be affected through the capacity platform, but must be done 
through bilateral trade or through an intraday trading platform like e.g. Elbas.”   
[Energinet.dk] 
 
Figure 4. The structure of the Danish power market. [Energinet.dk] 
The Danish Electricity Supply Act together with provisions from the TSO, Energinet.dk, 
determines the roles of the different market players. The TSO is responsible for the physical 
transmission system and for maintaining the supply-demand balance. The TSO also develops 
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market rules aimed at making both the wholesale and retail electricity markets well 
functioning. [Energinet.dk] 
Balance responsible parties have agreed with the Danish TSO to bear the responsibility for 
production, consumption, and trade activities in a certain responsibility area. This means 
that they are also financially responsible for any possible imbalances in their responsibility 
area. [Energinet.dk] 
Other roles in the power market are those of electricity supplier, companies with supply 
obligations, grid companies, producers, and end users with grid access as well as Nordpool 
power exchange. Electricity suppliers buy power from the exchange, directly from the 
producer, or another supplier and sells this power to end users. Customers can freely switch 
suppliers. Companies with supply obligation are ”authorised companies supplying end users 
who have not exercised their right to choose an electricity supplier”. The Danish 
Competition Authority regulates the prices they can collect from consumers. Grid 
companies are responsible for the management of the distribution grid and for metering 
both production and consumption. Producers sell their power either to Nordpool or directly 
to suppliers, and also sell power to and buy it from Energinet.dk in the regulating power 
market. Likewise also consumption can be used in the regulating market in keeping the 
power system in balance and secure.  [Energinet.dk] 
5.1.1 Regulating power market and balancing power market 
The balancing market has two parts: a regulating power market and a balancing power 
market. The regulating power market is where the TSO buys power from or sells it to players 
during the delivery hour, based on bids for upward or downward regulation reserves made 
earlier. The balancing power market, on the other hand, is where the TSO buys power from 
45 
 
the players and sells it to them in order to “neutralize imbalances incurred by them”. The 
difference between these two markets is that the results of the balancing power trades 
cannot be calculated until after the delivery hour, when metering data is available and the 
size of the imbalances known. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
5.1.1.1 Regulating power 
Energinet.dk is as the TSO of Denmark responsible for the balance of the total power 
system, and is a part of the Nordic regulating power market, NOIS. This market functions 
much like the spot market does, and the market price for regulating power is formed hourly, 
and is the same in all of the spot market areas if no bottlenecks exist. This regulating power 
(RP) price is also a determining factor in forming the price for balancing power. 
[Energinet.dk, 2008] 
Players can enter the regulating power market in two different ways. They can respond to 
the TSO’s invitation to tender for ancillary services and regulating reserves by committing to 
keeping manual reserves available for use through entering bids for a certain amount of 
regulating power for a certain time period. If these bids are activated, then the player gets 
an availability payment in addition to the usual energy payment. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
The other way for players to enter the regulating power market is to make no specific 
agreement, or bilateral contract with the TSO about bidding, but rather just enter bids when 
they wish. However, using this method means that the players will not get an availability 
payment upon activation of their bids. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
In both methods, the bids can range from 10 to 50MW in size, and the player must be able 
to fully activate the bids within a maximum of 15 minutes of the activation order. The bids 
can cover one day of operation, and can be adjusted in terms of both price and volume until 
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45 minutes before delivery hour. The bids must specify separate prices and quantities for 
upward and downward regulation hour by hour. For upward regulation, the minimum price 
will be the spot price in the given area, and the maximum price for downward regulation 
will also be the spot price of that hour in the given area. Energinet.dk has defined a total 
maximum price for upward regulation of 37,500 DKK/MWh.  [Energinet.dk, 2008]  
The activation of regulation bids normally starts with the one with the lowest price. 
Sometimes some bids are bypassed, if their activation is prevented by a bottleneck or if they 
cannot be activated in a manner that complies with the Nordic system operators’ 
conditions, or if there is some sort of special situation with the regulation. In special 
situations where there are not enough bids for regulating power, the TSO may ask for more 
bids. The activation orders are communicated to players either through power schedules “at 
5-minute intervals” sent by the TSO to them, or through direct activation without schedules. 
[Energinet.dk, 2008]  
In both cases, the commitment of the player is broken down into a schedule of many 
24MWh/h commitments, and settlement is then based on this “supplementary schedule” 
together with the bid that was approved for regulation. Thanks to the supplementary 
schedule, there is available a time series of the commitments of players’ activated 
regulating bids. The next day, the TSO sends the player a “statement” of the volumes 
activated and prices involved. The player then has some hours to comment on this 
statement, on for example possible discrepancies. Possible differences have to be settled 
the same day, but if this is not possible they are settled outside the normal procedure at a 
later date. Billing and paying for regulating power takes place a month at a time. 
[Energinet.dk, 2008] 
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The RP price on the Nordic regulating power market is calculated every hour based on a 
marginal price principle, meaning that it most is often set at the level of the most recent bid 
to be activated on the common list. This is of course true only if bottlenecks or anything else 
don’t prevent the free flow of power between the different spot market areas. In case 
bottlenecks do exist, the regulating power market area is split, and the area with a 
bottleneck will have a separate price.  [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
If both upward and downward regulation bids are activated in the same hour, then the price 
is determined differently. For example, when the aggregate regulation is upward, the price 
for activated downward regulation is the one in the bid (“pay-as-bid”) and the upward 
regulation price is the common RP price. And this applies also vice versa. 
In some cases, Energinet.dk selects regulation bids for upward or downward regulation in 
another order than the price order. This is called special regulation, and it may be required 
in case of bottlenecks or restrictions in the Danish grid or in the transmission grids of 
neighbour areas. Another possible reason is announced or unannounced tests of reserve 
plants. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
5.1.1.2 Balancing power 
The balancing power market is where the TSO manages the unforeseen imbalances 
between production and consumption in its area. [Nordpool Spot web page]  
Balancing power settlement is based on notifications and power schedules sent by the 
balance responsible parties, in practice retailers of power, as well as their metered 
production and consumption. The notification comprises at most three things; the original 
BRP notification sent the day before and approved by the TSO, adjustments made during 
the day of operation, and the supplementary schedule. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
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After the day of operation, grid companies or “their metering point administrators” send 
metered time series of production and consumption to the TSO in order that purchase and 
sale of balancing power can be calculated. This calculation of imbalances between trade and 
actual consumption and production is done separately for Eastern and Western Denmark. 
Also the imbalances between actual production and notifications as well as actual 
consumption and notifications of it are calculated separately, and thus BRPs receive two 
hour-by-hour balance calculations for every 24 hours. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
The balancing market has active and passive participants, the active ones being those 
producers and consumers that can regulate their production or consumption on request 
from the TSO. The passive participants, on the other hand, are all of the companies that are 
connected to the grid and have balance agreements with a TSO. All of their production and 
consumption is measured and the difference between planned and measured generation is 
settled at the prices that are established during real time balancing. [Nordpool Spot web 
page]  
Retailers estimate the consumption of their end customers, and buy the required amount of 
power before delivery hour. Then after the delivery hour, the accounts are settled. In case 
customers have used less power than estimated initially, the retailer “has per definition sold 
the excess power to the system operator”, and the system operator pays the retailer for the 
power. If, on the other hand, the customers have used more power than was estimated, the 
“retailer automatically buys power from the system operator”. As a result of this trading 
with the system operator, the retailer reaches a balance between his net purchases and 
consumption, thus the name balancing power. In essence then the balancing power market 
is a market between the TSO and retailers of power. [Nordpool Spot web page]      
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If for example a retailer’s customers have used less power than the retailer has bought from 
the supplier before delivery hour, this means that the retailer has in effect sold power to the 
TSO. This power is what is called the balancing power. The TSO then pays the retailer for this 
power. If the TSO had to buy up-regulation during the hour in question, the retailer gets 
paid the same up-regulating price that the producers that sold the up-regulation to the TSO 
during that hour. This price will most often be higher than the market price. If the TSO had 
to buy down-regulation during the hour in question, the retailer gets paid the down-
regulating price, usually lower than the market price. [Houmøller, A. 2009] 
In the opposite case, where the retailer’s customers have used more power than the retailer 
purchased in beforehand, the retailer has to purchase this extra amount from the TSO who 
then charges the retailer for it. Again, if the TSO has had to buy up-regulation during this 
hour, then the TSO charges also the retailer the up-regulating price, and if he has had to 
purchase down-regulation he charges the down-regulating price. [Houmøller, A. 2009] 
Also producers may have to settle balancing energy with the TSO using this market, in case 
they fail to produce according to plan. This can happen for example if a plant breaks down 
ten minutes before operation hour, when it is no longer possible to purchase power from 
another producer. “The retailer has to pay the producer, even though the producer has not 
produced anything. In this instance, the TSO sells balancing energy to the producer, and the 
producer resells the energy to the retailer.” [Houmøller, A. 2009] 
Although the basic procedure for settling the balancing energy with the TSO is the same for 
the producer as well, the price is determined somewhat differently. During an hour with up-
regulation, the producer who produces too much does not get the up-regulating price but 
instead the market price. Those producing too little will be charged the up-regulating price. 
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During hours with down-regulation, producers who produce too much get the down-
regulating price and those producing too little are invoiced the market price. [Houmøller, A. 
2009]  
Even if no active regulation has been used, players still have imbalances to be settled. This is 
also done by Energinet.dk, and the balancing power is traded between players at the spot 
market price, thus yielding no profit to the TSO. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
5.2 Market arrangements for frequency control and capacity instruments 
5.2.1 Ancillary services in Denmark in general 
In order to ensure secure and reliable power system operation, Energinet.dk buys ancillary 
services. The volume and type of ancillary services needed varies dynamically throughout 
the year, and there are also some regional differences between Eastern and Western 
Denmark. Ancillary services are bought from electricity consumers and producers in 
Denmark and neighbouring countries, and used for various purposes. Thus also the 
requirements for their supply vary, and there are some differences in the supplier 
requirements also between Eastern Denmark (DK2), and Western Denmark (DK1). The Great 
Belt divides Denmark into these two parts. [Energinet.dk] 
The services that Energinet.dk buys in Western Denmark include primary reserves, 
secondary reserves, Load Frequency Control (LFC), black-start capability, manual reserves, 
and short-circuit power, reactive reserves as well as voltage control. In Eastern Denmark, 
Energinet.dk buys services called frequency-controlled disturbance reserve, frequency-
controlled normal operation reserve, manual reserves, and short-circuit power, reactive 
reserves as well as voltage control. Of these, frequency controlled disturbance reserves are 
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the only reserves, for which only upward regulation bids are invited. All other reserves are 
used for both upward and downward regulation. [Energinet.dk]  
In order to supply ancillary services to the TSO, a supplier has to sign a main agreement. 
These are only signed with balance responsible parties for production and consumption. 
Additionally, all the plants that supply the ancillary services have to be approved by 
Energinet.dk. A main agreement simplifies the process of further transactions, as those 
suppliers that are parties to one don’t have to send bids to the daily reserve auctions. 
[Energinet.dk] [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.2 Primary reserve, Western Denmark (DK1) 
Primary reserve is used for stopping frequency deviations. It is automatic, and supplied by 
production or consumption that automatically responds to frequency deviations in the grid, 
by means of regulating equipment. Denmark is part of the ENTSO-E RG Continental Europe 
synchronous grid, where all TSOs are responsible for providing a certain share of the 
combined primary reserve requirement. Denmark’s share is determined based on the share 
of Western Denmark’s power production of the total ENTSO-E RG Continental Europe group 
production. In 2011, the Danish share of the combined requirement is +/- 27MW. The 
Danish TSO buys the primary reserve in daily auctions. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Western Denmark can also import and export primary reserves from other TSOs in the 
Continental Europe group, but as these transfers are limited to neighbour TSOs in the same 
“control block”, this in practice means Germany. Before such transfers can take place, an 
agreement has to be made between the TSOs involved, and the maximum transfers allowed 
are +/- 90 MW. But it is also possible to import reserves up to several hundred MW from 
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Sweden, Norway, Finland, and DK2, i.e. Eastern Denmark, provided that transmission 
capacity is sufficient. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
The primary reserve “must as a minimum be supplied linearly at frequency deviations of 
between 20 and 200 MHz”, this is relative to the goal frequency of 50Hz. Half of the reserve 
has to be supplied within 15 seconds, and the rest in full within 30 seconds, at a frequency 
deviation of +/- 200 MHz. The reserve must be possible to maintain until subsequent 
automatic or manual reserves are activated, but the maximum time is 15 minutes. After use, 
the reserve has to be “re-established” after 15 minutes. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
The auction for primary reserve is held once daily, for the next 24 hours at a time. The 24-
hour period is divided into four-hour blocks for the auction. Bids are sent to the TSO via 
Ediel, which is a communication tool. All bids must be with Energinet.dk by 3 pm the day 
before the 24-hour period, and must include volumes and prices per MW for reserve power 
for each four-hour block of the following 24-hour period. The minimum bid is 0.3 MW. Bids 
are selected by Energinet.dk in their entirety or not at all, and they are accepted in the order 
of increasing prices. In case there are not enough bids, Energinet.dk emails all players with a 
request for bids. [Energinet.dk, 2010]  
All accepted bids receive an availability payment that corresponds to the price of the highest 
priced bid accepted. If it turns out at a later time that the reserve offered was not actually 
available, the availability payment is cancelled. “No calculation is made of energy volumes 
supplied from primary reserves.”  [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.3 Secondary reserve/ LFC, Western Denmark (DK1) 
Secondary reserve is used to restore frequency to 50 Hz after a major disturbance, following 
the stabilisation done using the primary reserve. Secondary reserve actually has two tasks; 
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first, it releases the primary reserves, and second, it restores possible imbalances on 
interconnections. Secondary reserve production and consumption units respond 
automatically to signals from the TSO. The response is possible by means of regulating 
equipment. The signal from Energinet.dk is sent online as an output value with a reference 
to the bid made by the player. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Energinet.dk buys the secondary reserve once a month, according to requirements 
published on its web pages at the latest on the 10th day of the prior month. The ENTSO-E RG 
Continental Europe group recommends a secondary reserve of circa +/- 90 MW. However, 
this recommendation is not binding as an upper limit, and in Denmark an additional 
consideration is the uncertainty in the forecasts of wind power availability. ENTSO-E RG is 
also about to make it possible to purchase up to one third of the secondary reserve outside 
of DK1, and to respectively sell secondary reserve to outside DK1, up to one third of the 
buying TSO’s reserve requirements. These are of course subject to whether there is enough 
transmission capacity available. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
The secondary reserve requested must be supplied within 15 minutes. It can be supplied 
either through “in-service” plants exclusively or through a combination of in-service and fast 
start-up plants. However, “the reserve to be supplied within any coming five-minute period 
must be supplied by in-service units”. An added requirement is that is has to be possible to 
continuously maintain the regulation. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
As with primary reserve, a regulation delivery can be a combined delivery of several 
production or consumption units with different properties, provided that the combined 
system is verified to Energinet.dk and certain conditions are met. These conditions include 
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rules on balance responsibility in such cases and also on how the bids are handled by 
Energinet.dk. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
All bids for secondary reserve must be sent by email to Energinet.dk by a deadline, after 
which Energinet.dk reviews the bids and negotiates with “relevant” bidders. The bids are 
evaluated based on, in order of importance, the price of service offered, place of service 
delivery, as well as the technical characteristics of the production or consumption unit that 
has made the bid. Unlike with primary reserve, here the selection of bids is not based only 
on price, and neither does Energinet.dk have to accept the bids as they are. Energinet.dk 
may for example accept parts of bids, order other volumes than those offered, and also 
after agreement with the reserve supplier alter the agreement periods. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Also the price of secondary reserves is determined in individual negotiations between the 
bidder and Energinet.dk. If it is later shown that the capacity was not actually available, the 
capacity payment is cancelled. “Deliveries of energy from secondary upward regulation 
reserves are settled per MWh at the DK1 electricity spot price plus DKK 100/MWh, however 
based at least on the regulating power price for upward regulation. Deliveries of energy 
from secondary downward regulation reserves are settled per MWh at the DK1 electricity 
spot price less DKK 100/MWh, however not exceeding the regulating power price for 
downward regulation. The energy delivered is calculated on the basis of registrations in 
Energinet.dk’s SCADA system as an integrated value of expected activated output per 
quarter.” [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.4 Frequency-controlled normal operation reserve, Eastern Denmark (DK2) 
Frequency-controlled normal operation reserve is used in Eastern Denmark to restore 
frequency to the 50Hz level after frequency deviations. Like primary reserve in Western 
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Denmark, frequency-controlled normal operation reserve is also automatic. It is provided by 
production and consumption units that respond to frequency deviations in the grid by 
means of regulating equipment. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
The TSOs in the ENTSO-E RG Nordic synchronous area have joint responsibility for providing 
enough frequency-controlled normal operation reserve for the area. The total requirement 
for this reserve in the area is 600MW, and DK2 has to provide an amount of this 
proportional to its power production in relation to the entire Nordic area. This amount is 
determined once every year, and for 2011 the DK2 requirement is 23 MW. [Energinet.dk, 
2010] 
ENTSO-E RG rules allow the purchasing and selling of this reserve from and to outside the 
Danish TSO’s area, so long as two thirds of the reserve are supplied within the area. The 
reserve must be supplied within +/- 100 mHz of the reference frequency of 50 Hz. 
Regardless of the size of the frequency deviation, the activated reserve has to be supplied 
within 150 seconds. It also has to be possible to maintain the regulation continuously. 
Deliveries can also here be combined deliveries of several production or consumption units 
that together can produce the response in the required time, so long as this arrangement 
has been agreed upon with the TSO. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
The frequency-controlled normal operation reserve is bought at daily auctions. The auctions 
periods of 24-hours are divided into six four-hour blocks, and bids for the auction must be 
sent via Ediel to Energinet.dk by 3 pm on the day before operation, at the latest. The bids 
must include the volume of megawatts offered for each block, as well as the price requested 
for it. The minimum bid is 0.3 MW. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
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Bids are accepted in the order of increasing price per megawatt, and they are accepted in 
whole or not at all. In case there are too little bids, Energinet.dk requests more by e-mail. All 
accepted bids receive an availability payment that corresponds to the price of the highest 
priced bid accepted. Again, unless the capacity is actually available, the availability payment 
will be cancelled. “No calculation is made of amounts of energy supplied from frequency-
controlled normal operation reserves.” [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.5 Frequency-controlled disturbance reserve (DK2) 
The frequency-controlled disturbance reserve is used in case of major disturbances, such as 
outages of major plants or lines. It is fast, automatic upward regulation supplied by either 
production units or consumption units that respond to frequency drops through the use of 
regulating equipment. When the system frequency drops under 49.9 Hz, this reserve 
becomes active and stays so until the frequency has been restored or manual reserves take 
over. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
In the ENTSO-E RG Nordic grid, there is a combined requirement for frequency-controlled 
disturbance reserves, and the TSOs of the area are jointly responsible for providing this. This 
requirement is the size of the single largest contingency in the grid, minus 200 MW. Eastern 
Denmark’s share of this is determined based on the largest contingency in DK2, and is 
determined once a week. For 2011, the total share of DK2 is 150 MW. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
A minimum of two thirds of the reserve has to be supplied from within the TSO’s own area, 
but the rest can be imported. Part of the disturbance reserve of the ENTSO-E RG Nordic area 
comes via HVDC connections from Germany and DK1 via Sweden. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Frequency-controlled disturbance reserves have to be capable of supplying non-linear 
power in the frequency range of 49.5 to 49.9 Hz, supplying half of their response within five 
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seconds, and also supplying the rest of the response within another 25 seconds. Production 
or consumption units with different properties can make combined deliveries, provided that 
this arrangement has been agreed upon with Energinet.dk. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Energinet.dk buys also frequency-controlled disturbance reserves at daily auctions for the 
coming 24-hour period. Like with the above discussed reserve types, the 24-hour period is 
for the purposes of the auction divided into four-hour blocks. Players’ bids must show the 
volume they are willing to offer within each block, and the price at which they are willing to 
offer it. These bids are sent to the TSO via Ediel by 3 pm on the day before operation. Again 
the minimum bid size is 0.3 MW, and bids are accepted in the order of increasing price per 
MW. Bids are accepted in total or not at all, and when there is a shortage of bids, the TSO 
requests more via email. All accepted bids get an availability payment that corresponds to 
the price of the highest bid accepted. “No calculation is made of energy volumes supplied 
from frequency-controlled disturbance reserves.” [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.6 Manual reserve, DK1 and DK2 
Manual reserve is activated manually by Energinet.dk from its Control Centre, through 
orders to relevant suppliers. In case of minor imbalances, manual reserve relieves the LFC 
and frequency-controlled normal operation reserve, and it is also used to ensure balance in 
case of possible outages and limitations in generation or interconnections. [Energinet.dk, 
2010] 
“The reserve is requested at daily auctions, to meet the demand during individual hours.” 
Within 15 minutes of activation, the reserve has to be fully supplied. In activating the 
reserve, production schedules and consumption forecasts previously agreed upon by the 
supplier and Energinet.dk are amended. Several production or consumption units can make 
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combined deliveries, after agreeing on the arrangement with Energinet.dk. [Energinet.dk, 
2010] 
The Danish TSO buys both upward and downward manual regulation via auctions held once 
a day for “each of the hours of the coming 24-hour period”.  Final bids are sent to the TSO 
via Ediel by 9.30 am on the day before the 24-hour operation period. The bids must have 
the volume the supplier is willing to offer and the price per MW at which he is willing to 
offer it for each hour of the 24-hour period. Bids can vary in size between 10 and 50 MW. 
[Energinet.dk, 2010] 
In the basic scenario, the TSO covers his need of manual reserves with bids starting from the 
lowest priced ones, and proceeding to the more expensive ones. However, in special cases 
when the TSO needs reserves in some particular geographic location, he will disregard the 
price order and consider the locations of the bids instead. Bids are accepted in total, or not 
at all. In case of insufficient bids, Energinet.dk asks for more via email. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
All accepted bids get an availability payment that corresponds to the price of the highest 
priced accepted bid. This availability payment is subject to two rules. First, the player has to 
“subsequently submit a bid for activating all the capacity in respect of which an availability 
payment is obtained”; this applies for the hours that the player receives the availability 
payment for. Second, the capacity must really be available for use, and if shown otherwise, 
the availability payment is cancelled. Deliveries are checked on a test basis [Energinet.dk, 
2010] 
In some cases, the Great Belt connection from DK2 to DK1 can be fully loaded and then 
Energinet.dk will need more manual reserve than what it bought in DK1 in the morning. It 
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will then have an additional auction in the afternoon, just like the one held in the morning, 
but with separate bid IDs for the bids in this auction. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.7 Short-circuit power, reactive reserves, and voltage regulation, DK1 and 
DK2 
 Short-circuit power, reactive reserves, and voltage regulation are used for ensuring safe and 
stable operation in the power system. After Energinet.dk has received the operational 
schedules for the next day, it checks them for load flow, short-circuit power, n-1 situations, 
and reactive reserves. If there are any changes within the 24-hour operation period, these 
are checked again.  [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Only “primary” units that are connected to the high-voltage grid can provide short-circuit 
power and reactive reserves at present. Energinet.dk states that three primary power 
stations must be operative in both Western and Eastern Denmark, and in Western Denmark 
these units have to be at three different locations. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
In order to ensure the short-circuit power, reactive reserves, and voltage regulation, the 
Danish TSO can request forced operation of units at various times. For example, on a 
monthly or weekly basis, early the day before, after the close of the spot market, after 
receiving first operational schedules, and during the 24-hour operation period. If there is 
not enough of any of the three capacities, then the “balance” watch of Energinet.dk can 
undertake special regulation or forced operation in order to ensure system security.  
[Energinet.dk, 2010] 
If it is in any way possible, bids will be requested in advance for the solving of the problem, 
and this means that players may be asked to bid at quite short notice. Forced operation is 
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settled as billed, and separate payment is made for short-circuit power volumes, MVA, 
reactive power, and MVAr that are supplied. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
In the weekly or monthly case, bids are sent to Energinet.dk via mail or email, and after 
possible negotiations, Energinet.dk orders these services using a purchase order. Payment is 
made for keeping the plants in operation, and cancelled if it turns out that they were not 
really in operation. This does not apply in the case of possible breakdowns, when the TSO 
will take on the responsibility for starting up a new plant. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
5.2.7.1 Neighbouring TSOs 
When it comes to interconnections with neighbouring TSOs, Energinet.dk must fulfil the 
approved 24-hour notifications. There are slightly different rules for the settlement of 
possible imbalances for each interconnection. [Energinet.dk, 2008] 
5.2.7.2 Force majeure situations 
In situations where there is a threat to the security of supply, and which can leave large 
areas without access to power, for example large or extreme weather, Energinet.dk can 
declare force majeure. In such a situation, Energinet.dk can use all resources in the system, 
within their individual technical limitations, in order to restore or secure “normal 
operational reliability”. At the same time, rules as to settlement of balancing power are 
suspended and balancing power is settled at the area price, while market players pay each 
other according to contracts, as in any other situation. [Energinet.dk] 
5.2.8 Ensuring capacity adequacy 
Energinet.dk is “legally responsible for ensuring enough capacity”. At the moment there are 
no capacity payments or obligations in use, but they are apparently in the pipeline; there is 
“work in progress within this area”. At present, a producer has to send an application to the 
Danish Energy Agency if he wants to take a generating unit out of operation. Then 
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Energinet.dk delivers a statement, in which it either opposes or approves of the removal of 
the unit. There is no exchange of money involved in this process. [Henning Parbo, 
Energinet.dk] 
A new generating unit can be installed after an investor first receives necessary local 
permissions. In the years 2006-2009, circa 280 MW of capacity has been built to serve solely 
as manual reserves. [Henning Parbo, Energinet.dk] 
5.2.9 Guiding the capacity mix 
In guiding the capacity mix, the government plays the main role. The political wish is to 
“bring forward investments” in both on- and offshore wind power, and there are several 
subsidy schemes in use for this purpose. [Henning Parbo, Energinet.dk] 
In Denmark the generation of power from renewable sources is supported using price 
premiums and fixed feed in tariffs. As a general rule, the support scheme in place when a 
plant is connected to the grid applies for the life time of the plant. Yet historically, the level 
of support has varied a lot, meaning that there is a high level of uncertainty about the 
support amount at the time of investment. [Danish Energy Agency web site] 
In 2008, the level of support that power from wind, biomass, and biogas receive was 
increased. The support level for solar PV, wave power, fuel cells, and other renewables 
remained the same, but a fund that supports the adoption of these technologies at the sum 
of 25 million DKK per year for a time period of four years, was founded. Another fund, 
EUDP, gives out one billion DKK worth of funds annually to support the development and 
demonstration of new energy technologies. [Danish Energy Agency web site] 
The funds for the support for renewable energy are collected by Energinet.dk, as a so called 
Public Service Obligation (PSO) on all consumers’ electricity bills. This PSO is the tariff 
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charged by Energinet.dk on behalf of the society in order to finance subsidies for renewable 
energy production and development. In the last quarter of 2010, the PSO was 8.5 ore/kWh 
in DK1, and 7.7 ore/kWh in DK2. The funds gathered with the PSO tariff are used for various 
purposes, including as subsidies for environmentally-friendly power production, to pay for 
connection of said generation to the grid, to ensure security of supply, to perform 
environmental investigations with regard to offshore wind, and R&D of environmentally-
friendly generation.  [Energinet.dk homepage] 
The goal of the Danish government is for Denmark to in the long term become totally 
independent of fossil fuels, which at present account for 85 percent of the country’s energy 
need. There are two quite obvious reasons for this goal; the GHG emissions of fossil fuels 
and the constantly decreasing security of supply due to supplier concentration in often 
unstable areas and increasing prices brought on by the gradual decreasing of reserves. 
[Danish Energy Authority, 2007] Of course there are differences between the fossil fuels; for 
example coal is a readily available fuel and the risks in terms of its price and availability are 
small when compared to natural gas or oil.  
Denmark can be thought of as being in quite a good position to handle these challenges, as 
it already has experience with “developing new and efficient energy technologies and 
applying them in practice”. At the same time, it is stated that any new energy policy 
adopted has to be cost effective and help in maintaining growth, high employment, as well 
as competitive advantage. Also international cooperation, particularly with the EU is 
mentioned to be essential. These are the reasons behind the government adopting a long-
term energy policy until 2025. [Danish Energy Authority, 2007] 
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By 2025, the Danish government has stated that it will reduce the use of fossils in the 
country by 15 percent, as well as “effectively counteract the rises in overall energy 
consumption, which must remain static”. The policy names three crucial areas, where the 
goals are to be reached. These are efficient energy generation and consumption, renewable 
energy, as well as new and more efficient energy technologies. [Danish Energy Authority, 
2007] 
The area of efficient energy generation pertains to the goal that Denmark needs to continue 
to be able to have significant economic growth without this increasing overall energy 
consumption as has been the case since 1972, and that this must be accomplished through 
the use of “market-based initiatives”. As an example of a specific goal, it is mentioned that 
initiatives in energy saving have to grow by 1.25 percent per annum. [Danish Energy 
Authority, 2007] 
In the crucial area of renewable energy, the government is going to provide “effective 
market-based initiatives which in time with the development of new technology will 
increase the share of renewable energy consumed while ousting fossil fuels”. By 2025, the 
target is to cover at least 30 percent of energy consumption with renewable sources. By 
2020, the share of bio fuels in transportation is to be increased to 10 percent. It is possible 
that partial targets will be set also before 2020, if technologies that are both economically 
competitive and environmentally sustainable are developed before then. [Danish Energy 
Authority, 2007] 
The final crucial area of new and more efficient energy technologies pertains to the goal of 
providing optimal conditions for research into energy technology for the Danish researchers. 
This is in order to make it possible to develop new technologies, and already known 
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technologies to the point where they can be brought to the market. By 2010, the goal was 
to establish annual support of DKK 1 billion to research, development, and demonstration of 
energy technology. The technologies that are seen as the most promising in terms of the 
Danish objectives are second generation bio fuels, hydrogen and fuel cells, wind power, and 
energy efficiency, in buildings especially. [Danish Energy Authority, 2007] 
In more detail, the government’s proposals include a reform of the subsidy system to 
renewables (PSO) to get a lower unit cost for renewable energy, increased use of biogas, 
more wind energy, more waste usage in central power stations for CHP, rationalisation of 
the tax system to support renewable adoption and fossil fuel decrease, more heat pumps in 
households to replace old oil boilers, and more flexibility in the choice of fuels for electricity 
generation and heating with the goal of promoting gradual increases in the use of bio fuels 
in CHP. [Danish Energy Authority, 2007]  
Increased amounts of large scale wind and other, more local, renewables mean that the grid 
will have to be expanded. Also the natural gas infrastructure will have to be renewed, in 
order to get access to Russian and Norwegian natural gas, when production from the 
reserves in the North Sea starts to drop off and Denmark will have to start importing gas. It 
is predicted this will happen in 2015. Aside from expansion, another important issue is 
clarifying which geographical areas will be suitable for offshore wind turbines, and how 
many wind farms each area could accommodate. [Danish Energy Authority, 2007] 
5.3 Challenges in the Danish power system/ in realising the energy policy 2025  
The Danish Energy Association states that one of the biggest challenges in the Danish 
system is the improvement of energy efficiency. According to the Energy Association this is 
due to the fact that there is at the moment no proper control over energy consumption and 
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GHG emissions in the transport, agriculture, non-energy-intensive industry sectors, as well 
as individual heating in private homes and the public sector. In other words, all other areas 
except power generation and energy-intensive industry covered by the European emission 
trading system. It is further stated that unless something “drastic” is done about energy 
efficiency in these areas, the emissions will soon “threaten the carbon account”. The 
prediction is that if no action is taken, Denmark will face a deficit of minimum four million 
tonnes in the carbon account. [DanskEnergi website] 
The present consumption of fossil fuels in the Danish system is undesirable, as it makes 
Denmark dependent on producer countries and the insecurities of transport routes, as well 
as contributing to GHG emissions. Also their increasing prices are a threat, in that to remain 
competitive the Danish industry must also have access to competitively priced electricity. 
These reasons have led to the ambitious goal of Denmark ultimately producing all its energy 
through renewable sources. Keeping energy consumption from increasing will be a large 
part of reaching this goal. [Danish Energy Authority, 2007] 
Also the Great Belt Power Link that was taken into operation on the 20th of August 2010 has 
brought some challenges. The DC link has a capacity of 600 MW and unites Western and 
Eastern Denmark. The two still remain separate bidding areas, but the link can be used for 
spot market, Elbas, and the regulating power market, and off-setting imbalances in both 
areas, as well as sharing reserves between DK1 and DK2. [nordpoolspot.com] [Birkebæk, 
2009] The link has taken electricity prices down, which means that the owners of previously 
built reserve plants are not terribly happy as their plants are no longer feasible. [Iversen, 
Bent] 
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A large challenge to the whole system is the “volatility in the market due to 
interconnections and the large amount of wind”. This volatility makes it difficult to plan 
investments (“price a big plant”), when you “don’t even know the price for the next day”. 
[Iversen, Bent] 
  
67 
 
6 Summary of instruments in Denmark, Poland, and Pennsylvania-Jersey-
Maryland (PJM) in the United States 
The previous chapter on Denmark was an in-depth look at how the developed framework 
for frequency control and capacity adequacy functions in the case of a specific country. This 
chapter will include similar surveys of two further power systems; Poland and Pennsylvania-
Jersey-Maryland (PJM) in the United States. However, here we will not go into so much 
detail, but rather stay on the general level of identifying the different instruments used for 
frequency control and capacity adequacy assurance.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the dimensions on which the instruments 
differ between the power systems in question. To determine the dimensions that need to 
be specified in order that an instrument is defined, that it can be bought; in other words the 
dimensions that are essential in terms of market design. These are the parameters that 
players wishing to enter said markets need to be aware of. 
The tables below describe the instruments used for controlling frequency and ensuring 
capacity adequacy in Denmark, Poland, and PJM. Table 1 shows the frequency control 
instruments used in Denmark. These have already been discussed in the previous chapter, 
so here just a brief recapitulation.  
6.1 Summary of instruments  
In DK1, in other words Western Denmark, primary reserve is the reserve that automatically 
responds to frequency deviations. The response has to start in 15 seconds, and the reserve 
has to be in full operation within 30 seconds. The maximum time that the reserve is used is 
15 minutes, but after use it has to be re-established, i.e. ready for use again, in another 15 
minutes. Primary reserve is traded in a daily auction, where bids are selected in the order of 
increasing prices. Bids are selected in total or not at all. Both production and consumption 
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units can offer primary reserve in the auction, and all accepted bids get an availability 
payment corresponding to the value of the highest priced bid accepted. [Energinet.dk, 2010]  
Secondary reserve in DK1 is also automatic, but full operation is only required in 15 minutes. 
However, it must be possible to supply the reserve continuously. The TSO buys this reserve 
based on bids from production or consumption units and negotiations with them. Bids are 
selected based on multiple criteria, not just price. During the negotiations, the bids can be 
modified; they don’t have to be accepted as is. The providers of secondary reserve are paid 
the spot market price plus an additional payment per MWh. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
In DK2, the frequency-controlled normal operation reserve is an automatic reserve that has 
to be supplied in 150 seconds, regardless of the size of the frequency deviation. Continuous 
supply must be possible, and the reserve can be provided by either production or 
consumption units. The TSO buys the reserve on daily auctions, where bids are accepted in 
the order of increasing prices. Accepted bids receive an availability payment, corresponding 
to the price of the highest bid accepted. The other automatic reserve in use in DK2, the 
frequency-controlled disturbance reserve, differs from the normal operation reserve only in 
terms of response time. The disturbance reserve has to provide 50 percent of the response 
in five seconds, and the rest in another 25 seconds. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
Manual reserve has the same conditions in both DK1 and DK2. It is activated manually by 
the TSO, must provide full response in 15 minutes, and is traded on daily auctions, where 
bids are accepted in the order of increasing prices, in total or not at all. Accepted bids get an 
availability payment corresponding to the highest priced bid accepted. [Energinet.dk, 2010] 
69 
 
Table 2 describes the capacity instruments in use in Denmark. There are no actual capacity 
markets, payments, or obligations in use in Denmark, but all consumers have to pay a Public 
Service Obligation (PSO) tariff on their power bills, and this is used to support new 
renewable power generation in various ways, as established in the table below. [Danish 
Energy Agency, 2008] [Danish Energy Agency, website]  
Poland is part of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
(ENTSO-E), and as such it should in principle follow their regulation in terms of frequency 
control. Based on research and some interviews, it is quite certain that Poland has in one 
way or another at least implemented primary and secondary reserve with the specifications 
of the ENTSO-E Policy 1 on frequency control. However, there are no specific reserve plants 
in the country, and the reserve need is fulfilled using some spinning plants, some pumped 
storage, as well as some flow-of-river hydro. According to interviewees, the reserves are 
traded on a balancing market, of which there was no information readily available. [ENTSO-
E, 2009][Rajewski, 2011]   
According to the ENTSO-E Policy 1, the primary reserve has to be automatic and respond in 
a few seconds, provide half of the response in 15 seconds, and the total response in 30 
seconds. The minimum time that the reserve has to be able to deliver is 15 minutes, 
however it must be able to produce until secondary or tertiary reserve has completely offset 
the frequency deviation. The compensation for this reserve is the form of PLN/MWh. 
[ENTSO-E, 2009]    
Secondary reserve differs only in that it has to respond within 15 minutes and operate until 
tertiary takes over. Tertiary reserve, on the other hand, is a manual reserve, that operates 
until frequency is restored to the proper level. [ENTSO-E, 2009] 
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Instrument Signal Response time Duration Trading Buyer Seller Compensation Special 
Primary 
reserve 
DK1
Automatic 
response to 
frequency 
deviation
Start in 15 sec, 
full operation 
in 30 sec.
Maximum use 
15 minutes, re-
established in 
15 minutes
Auction, bids selected 
in the order of 
increasing prices, in 
their entirety or not at 
all
TSO Production or 
consumption unit
Availability payment 
corresponding to the 
price of the highest 
priced bid accepted, 
capacity €/MW
Secondary 
reserve 
DK1
Automatic 
response to 
manual signal
Full operation 
within 15 
minutes
Continuous 
supply must be 
possible
Bidding and 
negotiation, selection 
based on multiple 
criteria, bids not 
necessarily accepted 
as is2
TSO Production or 
consumption unit
Spot price +/- 
additional €/MWh1
Regulation for next 
five min must come 
from spinning 
reserve
Frequency-
controlled 
normal 
operation 
reserve 
DK2
Automatic 
response to 
frequency 
deviation
150 seconds Continuous 
supply must be 
possible
Auction, bids accepted 
in the order of 
increasing price per 
MW, in total or not at 
all
TSO Production or 
consumption unit
Availability payment, 
corresponding to the 
price of the highest bid 
accepted.
Frequency-
controlled 
disturbanc
e reserve 
DK2
Automatic 
response to 
frequency 
deviation
50 percent 
within five 
sec, rest 
within 
additional 25 
sec.
Active until 
frequency 
restored, or 
manual 
reserve 
activated
Auction, bids accepted 
in the order of 
increasing price per 
MW, in total or not at 
all
TSO Production or 
consumption unit
Availability payment, 
corresponding to the 
highest priced 
accepted bid, €/MW
Manual 
reserve 
DK1 and 
DK2
Manual 
activation by 
TSO
Full operation 
within 15 
minutes of 
activation
Auction, bids accepted 
in order of increasing 
prices, in total or not 
at all3
TSO Production or 
consumption unit
Availability payment, 
corresponding to the 
highest bid accepted, 
€/MW
 
Table 1 Frequency stability instruments in Denmark
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Instrument Use Payer Collected 
by
Payment 
method
Amount Special
Public 
Service 
Obligation 
(PSO)
To finance all of 
the below 
support 
mechanisms to 
renewable 
power 
All power 
consumers
Energine
t.dk
Charged 
on 
consume
rs' power 
bills
Varies annually; calculated by 
dividing the PSO expenses by 
the total electricity 
consumption.
In the third 
quarter of 2010, 
the PSO tariff was 
8.5 ore/kWh in 
DK1 and 7.7 
ore(kWh in DK2
Price 
premium for 
new wind 
turbines at 
land and sea
To support new 
wind generation
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO 25 ore/KWh for 22,000 full 
load hours plus an additional 
2.3 ore/KWh for the entire 
lifetime of the turbine
Special 
tenders for 
wind parks 
at sea
To support off 
shore wind parks
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO Depends on the wind park in 
question; Horns Rev II Wind 
park of 200 MW got a fixed 
feed in tariff of 51.8 ore/KWh 
for 50,000 full load hours, 
while Rodsand II wind park of 
200 MW got 62.9 ore/KWh for 
50,000 full load hours.
Support for 
household 
wind 
turbines
Support for 
turbines below 25 
kW connected to 
the installation in 
the home of the 
owner
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO Fixed feed in tariff of 60 
ore/KWh
New biomass 
fired units
Support for new 
units that 
produce power 
using biomass
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO 15 ore/KWh electricity In CHP plants, the 
heat produced 
using biomass is 
exempt from the 
energy tax
New biogas 
fired units
Support for new 
units producing 
power only from 
biologically or 
thermally 
gasified biomass
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO Fixed feed in tariff of 74.5 
ore/KWh.
If there are other 
fuels mixed with 
the biogas, the 
portion of the 
power produced 
using biogas gets 
a premium of 
40.5 ore/KWh
Special 
renewable 
energy 
technologies 
that are of 
importance 
to future 
generation 
of renewable 
energy
Support for 
technologies 
such as wave 
power, solar PV, 
fuel cells running 
on renewable 
fuels etc.
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO Fixed feed in tariff of 60 
ore/Kwhfor ten years, and 40 
ore/KWh for the following ten 
years
Small solar 
PV units in 
private 
installations
Solar PV units 
below 6 kW 
connected to the 
installation in 
private homes
All power 
consumers 
via PSO
Energine
t.dk
Via PSO Exempt from energy tax, no 
tariff or price premium
 
Table 2 Capacity instruments Denmark
72 
 
Instrument Signal Response time Duration Trading Buyer Seller Compensation Special 
Primary 
reserve
Automatic 
response
Start in a few 
seconds, 50 percent 
in 15 seconds, full 
operation in 30 
seconds
Minimum duration for the capability 
to deliver is 15 minutes; however, 
must delivered until power 
deviation completely offset by 
secondary/tertiary reserve
Balancing 
market
TSO Production units PLN/MWh No separate reserve 
plants, just some spinning 
reserve units, some 
pumped storage, and flow-
of-river hydro
Secondary 
reserve
Automatic 
response
Within 15 minutes at 
the most
Until tertiary takes over Balancing 
market
TSO Production units PLN/MWh No separate reserve 
plants, just some spinning 
reserve units, some 
pumped storage, and flow-
of-river hydro
Tertiary 
reserve
Manual 
response
N/A Until frequency is restored Balancing 
market
TSO Production units PLN/MWh No separate reserve 
plants, just some spinning 
reserve units, some 
pumped storage, and flow-
of-river hydro
 
Table 3 Frequency stability instruments in Poland 
Instrument Use Issuer Who 
responsible/ 
buyer
Basis for 
issuance
Trading Special
Green 
certificates
Renewable energy sources Energy 
Regulatory 
Office issues 
to plant 
operators
Power 
retailers 
(=distributors)
MWh of 
energy 
produced
Certificates can be traded on the free 
market, do not have to "follow" the power 
for which issued. No special pricing for 
power produced under certificates.
Certain percentage of power has to be 
generated using red, green, yellow 
sources. Penalty fee for missing 
certificates.
Yellow 
certificates
High-efficiency cogeneration 
with heat in either a plant 
with less than 1MWe capacity 
or in a gas-fired plant
En gy 
Regulatory 
Office
Power 
retailers 
(=distributors)
MWh of 
energy 
produced
Certificates can be traded on the free 
market, do not have to "follow" the power 
for which issued. No special pricing for 
power produced under certificates.
Certain percentage of power has to be 
generated using red, green, yellow 
sources. Penalty fee for missing 
certificates.
Red 
certificates
High-efficiency cogeneration 
in plants that do not fulfill the 
yellow certificate criteria
Energy 
Regulatory 
Office
Power 
retailers 
(=distributors)
MWh of 
energy 
produced
Certificates can be traded on the free 
market, do not have to "follow" the power 
for which issued. No special pricing for 
power produced under certificates.
Certain percentage of power has to be 
generated using red, green, yellow 
sources. Penalty fee for missing 
certificates.
 
Table 4 Capacity instruments in Poland 
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Instrument Mechanism/ 
Ways to fulfill 
obligation
Signal Response 
time and 
duration
Trading Seller/ 
Provider
Charges Compensation to provider 
of generation
Special
LSE regulation 
requirement (pro rata 
share of PJM regulation 
requirement4) 
Self-schedule of 
own resources/ 
i.e. using own 
resources
Automatic 
response to 
regulation 
signal 
Full 
operation 
within five 
minutes 
Production 
units/ DR 
(limited to 
25% of 
regulation 
requirement)
Self-schedulers are price 
takers; paid the regulation 
market clearing price 
($/MWh) times the number 
of MWs they scheduled for; 
opportunity cost not 
compensated here
These resources are 
guaranteed to run.  Their 
merit order price is set to 
zero, and thus when the set 
of resources with the 
lowest merit order prices 
are selected to run, self-
scheduled resources are 
always included in that set.
Bilateral 
transactions with 
other market 
participants
Automatic 
response to 
regulation 
signal 
Full 
operation 
within five 
minutes 
Bilateral 
transactions 
reported by the 
buyer to PJM's 
electronic system 
and confirmed by 
the seller
Arranged between 
the parties of the 
transaction
Arranged between the 
parties of the transaction
These must be for the 
physical transfer of 
regulation
Purchases from 
the PJM 
regulation 
market
Automatic 
response to 
regulation 
signal 
Full 
operation 
within five 
minutes 
Regulation market 
run by PJM, bids 
accepted in the 
order of increasing 
price (merit order 
price = regulation 
offer + 
opportunity cost)
Production 
units/ DR 
(limited to 
25% of 
regulation 
requirement)
LSEs charged the 
RMCP for the 
regulation they 
purchase, plus 
their share of 
opportunity cost 
credits
The higher of the regulation 
market clearing price 
($/MWh) or their respective 
merit order price. The 
RMCP is the highest merit 
order price awarded 
regulation. Merit order 
prices are determined for 
each offer; they are the bid 
price plus the estimated 
opportunity cost to run. 
(Estimated opportunity cost 
of demand resources is 
zero.)
In addition to market-based 
offer, also a cost-based 
offer must be submitted, as 
well as the relevant data to 
support the cost-based 
offer. 
 
Table 5 Frequency stability instruments in PJM, part I 
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Instrument Mechanism/ Ways to fulfill 
obligation
Signal Response 
time and 
duration
Trading Seller/ Provider Charges Compensation to provider 
of generation
Special
LSE Synchronized 
reserve 
requirement5
Owning Tier 1 resources from 
which the synchronized 
reserve zone obtains 
synchronized reserve6
Manual 
response to a 
call from the 
dispatcher
10 minutes 
to respond, 
continue 
until 
dispatcher 
directs to 
stop
A company's estimated Tier 1 
resources will be counted 
towards its obligation, but 
cannot make it negative. 
Excess Tier 1 will be allocated 
to companies with remaining 
obligations, based on load 
ratio share. Tier 1 calculated 
hourly.
Synchronized 
generators or 
demand response 
(limited to 25 
percent of the 
synchronized 
reserve requirement 
of the reserve zone)
SRMCP, $/MW and Tier 1 
credits
Self-schedule of owned Tier 
2 resources
Manual 
response to a 
call from the 
dispatcher
10 minutes 
to respond, 
continue 
until 
dispatcher 
directs to 
stop
Resources may self-schedule 
for Tier 2 synchronized 
reserve until 60 minutes 
before each hour.
Resources self-scheduled 
or PJM scheduled paid 
SRMCP, $/MW. 
If tier 1 resources 
enough to meet 
synchronized 
reserve 
requirement, no 
Tier 2 resources 
will be assigned, 
and the clearing 
price for them 
will be zero
Bilateral arrangements with 
other market participants
Manual 
response to a 
call from the 
dispatcher
10 minutes 
to respond, 
continue 
until 
dispatcher 
directs to 
stop
Offers entered by seller and 
accepted by buyer 
electronically
Charges 
arranged 
between 
parties
Payments arranged 
between parties
Purchases of synchronized 
reserves from the market
Manual 
response to a 
call from the 
dispatcher
10 minutes 
to respond, 
continue 
until 
dispatcher 
directs to 
stop
Any remaining obligation 
fulfilled using the 
synchronized reserve market, 
at the market clearing price
Synchronized 
generators or 
demand response 
limited to 25 percent 
of the synchronized 
reserve requirement 
of the reserve zone)
LSEs 
charged 
SRMCP 
plus their 
percenta
ge share 
of 
opportun
ity costs 
and Tier 
1 credits
The higher of SRMCP 
($/MW) or respective 
merit order price. The 
SRMCP is the highest 
merit order price of the 
lowest cost set of 
resources awarded Tier 2 
synchronized reserve. The 
merit order price equals 
the synhronized reserve 
bid price plus estimated 
opportunity cost for the 
resource.  
Table 6 Frequency control instruments in PJM, part II 
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Instrument Mechanism/ 
Ways to fulfill 
obligation
Signal Response time and 
duration
Trading Seller/ Provider Charges Compensation to 
provider of generation
Quick-start 
reserve
Specifically requested by 
PJM, if needed in addtion 
to synchronized reserve. 
This reserve not 
synchronized to the system
Generation available 
within ten minutes
Generally run-of-river 
hydro, pumped hydro, 
combustion turbines, 
and diesel type units
LSE 
supplemental 
reserve 
requirement
Self-schedule 
of own 
resources
PJM request, does not 
need to be synchronized to 
the system
Full response within 
interval of 10 to 30 
minutes
Market clearing price, 
$/MWh
Bilateral 
arrangements 
with other 
market 
participants
PJM request, does not 
need to be synchronized to 
the system
Full response within 
interval of 10 to 30 
minutes
Bilateral 
transactions 
reportes to 
PJM by buyer 
and confirmed 
by seller 
electronically
Arranged between the 
parties based on index 
provided by PJM
Arranged between the 
parties based on index 
provided by PJM
Purchases 
from the 
supplemental 
reserve 
market
PJM request, does not 
need to be synchronized to 
the system
Full response within 
interval of 10 to 30 
minutes
Voluntary, 
offer-based 
market that 
clears reserve 
requirements 
on a day-
ahead, 
forward basis. 
Results in 
hourly prices. 
Generally 
unsynchronized run-of-
river hydro, pumped 
hydro, industrial 
combustion turbines, jet 
engine/expander 
turbines, combined cycle 
and diesels OR 
generating capacity 
synchronized to the 
system and operating at 
a point deviating from 
economic dispatch OR 
load resources
Hourly supplemental 
reserve market clearing 
price times the number 
of MW purchased and a 
share of those costs that 
supplemental reserve 
resource providers were 
unable to cover via 
market clearing price.
The higher or the 
market clearing price 
($/MWh) or respective 
merit order price. The 
clearing price is the 
merit order price of the 
most expensive 
resource allocated. The 
merit order price 
equals bid plus 
opportunity cost.
 
Table 7 Frequency control instruments in PJM, part III
Method of 
participation
Activity Use Cost/ payment Buyer Provider What is traded Special
Reliability 
Pricing Model 
(RPM)
Base 
Residual 
Auction
Procurement of RTO 
obligation minus 
amount reserved for 
short lead time 
resources minus FRR 
obligation
Cost allocated 
to load serving 
entities 
through 
Locational 
Reliability 
Charge
PJM Generati
on units 
of 
demand 
response
Resource 
commitments to 
meet system 
peak load three 
years in advance
Variable 
resource 
requirement
Reliability 
Pricing Model 
(RPM)
1st 
Incremental 
Auction
PJM Generati
on units 
of 
demand 
response
Resource 
commitments to 
meet system 
peak load 20 
months prior to 
delivery year
Variable 
resource 
requirement
Reliability 
Pricing Model 
(RPM)
2nd 
Incremental 
Auction
PJM Generati
on units 
of 
demand 
response
Resource 
commitments to 
meet system 
peak load 10 
months prior to 
delivery year
Variable 
resource 
requirement
Reliability 
Pricing Model 
(RPM)
3rd 
Incremental 
Auction
PJM Generati
on units 
of 
demand 
response
Resource 
commitments to 
meet system 
peak load three 
months prior to 
delivery year
Variable 
resource 
requirement
Reliability 
Pricing Model 
(RPM)
Conditional 
Incremental 
Auction
Procurement of 
additional capacity in 
a Load Deliverability 
Area (LDA) to address 
reliability problem 
cause by significant 
transmission line 
delay
Cost allocated 
to load serving 
entities 
through 
Locational 
Reliability 
Charge
PJM Generati
on units 
of 
demand 
response
Resource 
commitments, 
this auction can 
be arranged at 
any time prior 
tp delivery year
Variable 
resource 
requirement
Reliability 
Pricing Model 
(RPM)
Interruptible 
load for 
reliability
Fixed 
Resource 
Requirement 
(FRR)
FRR Capacity 
Plan
LSE secures capacity 
to satisfy their load 
obligation
LSE does not 
pay Locational 
Reliability 
Charge, and 
does not 
receive RPM 
resource 
clearing prices 
for capacity 
included in 
the fixed 
capacity plan.
Only LSEs that 
meet eligibility 
requirements 
can participate 
in FRR. LSE 
submits a fixed 
capacity plan to 
PJM and thus 
meets a fixed 
resource 
requirement 
(=unforced 
capacity 
obligation)
Allow a) replacement 
resource 
procurement b) 
incresing or 
decreasing resource 
commitments due to 
reliability 
requirement 
adjustments 
c)deferred short-term 
resource 
procurement
Cost allocated 
to resource 
providers that 
purchased 
resources as 
well as load 
serving 
entities 
through 
Locational 
Reliability 
Charge
ILR option eliminated starting with 12/13 DY
Table 8 Capacity instruments in PJM 
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There is no capacity market in Poland, but there are three different kinds of tariffs in use; 
green, yellow, and red. They are all awarded by the Energy Regulatory Office to power 
retailers, who at the end of each year must present a certain amount of them to the Energy 
Regulatory Office. The amount is a predetermined share of their total sales volume in MWh. 
If they fall short of this amount, they have to pay a penalty. The size of the penalty is also 
determined in advance, at least one year to be exact, by the Ministry of Economy. The 
certificates can be traded on the free market, and they do not have to “follow” the power 
they were issued for. Thus, the power trade is totally separate from the trade of the 
certificates. [Rajewski, 2011][Pöyry, 2009] 
The green certificates are used for supporting renewable energy sources, and the yellow 
ones are for high-efficiency cogeneration in either a plant with less than 1MWe capacity or 
in a gas-fired plant. The red certificates support high-efficiency cogeneration that does not 
fulfil the criteria of the yellow certificates. [Pöyry, 2009] 
As there is at present a shortage of the “coloured” types of electricity, the price of the 
certificate stays close to the penalty fees, a little bit below it. The Energy Regulatory Office 
determines the penalty fee each year, and it is different for each type of coloured electricity. 
It is expected that the required share of coloured power is going to rise, and that the next 
amendment of the Energy Law will allow combining two certificate types. [Rajewski, 2011] 
Since the certificates were established in 2005 as a response to a European Union directive 
in 2005, the quota has been set higher each year. In 2008 it was 7 % of all power sold, in 
2009 it was 8.9 %, and in the years 2010-2012 it is 10.4 %. The gradual increases are planned 
to continue, and in 2017 the goal is to have the percentage at 12.9 %. [IEA homepage] 
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If someone doesn’t want to buy the certificates, they can pay a substitution fee, the amount 
of which is determined annually by the Energy Regulatory Office and tied to the average 
price of electricity produced from coal. If neither option is used, then there is a financial 
penalty. [IEA homepage] 
PJM has by far the most complicated market structure of the three cases. When it comes to 
frequency stability, there are two different obligations: the regulation obligation and the 
synchronized reserve obligation. There are also quick-start reserves and a supplemental 
reserve requirement. Together the synchronized reserve and quick-start reserve form the 
contingency, or primary reserve and the supplemental reserves are the secondary reserve. 
All of the reserves together are called the operating reserve. [pjm.com][PJM, 2010 (2)] 
The regulation obligation is determined based on the total regulation requirement of the 
TSO (=PJM), which during on-peak hours is one percent of the forecasted load for the day, 
and during off-peak one percent of forecasted valley load for the operating day in question. 
Regulation reserve is used for correcting for “the short-term changes in electricity use that 
might affect the stability of the power system”, in other words to help match production 
and load by adjusting generation output to maintain the target frequency, while 
synchronized reserve provides power if there is “an unexpected need for more power on a 
short notice”. Synchronized reserve can be provided by generators whose production can be 
increased rapidly, or by demand units that can drop load on short notice. [PJM, 
2010][Zhenyu et al, 2008][pjm.com] 
Load serving entities (LSE) can fulfil their obligation in a couple of ways. Whichever way an 
LSE chooses to fulfil their obligation, the regulation reserve must always respond 
automatically to a frequency drop, reaching full operation within five minutes. An LSE can 
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either use their own resources, or purchase the required resources from the regulation 
market, or make bilateral arrangements with other market participants. Any self-scheduled, 
i.e. an LSE’s own resources are always guaranteed to run. This is due to the nature of the 
resource selection process; all resources offered for regulation are put in order based on 
their “merit order price”, which is basically the bid price plus opportunity cost, and the 
resources with the lowest merit order prices are selected to fulfil the regulation need. The 
opportunity cost for self-scheduled resources is set to zero, and thus they are always 
selected to run. Self-schedulers are compensated the regulating market price ($/MWh) 
times their commitment. [PJM, 2010][PJM, website] 
LSEs can also buy resources from the regulating market, at the regulation market clearing 
price plus a share of the opportunity costs compensated to the generators providing the 
resources. The generators are compensated the higher of the regulation market clearing 
price or their respective merit order price. The details of bilateral arrangements are agreed 
between the parties involved, the transaction just needs to be for physical transfer of 
regulation and they need to be reported to PJM. [PJM, 2010] 
The synchronized reserve obligation is different. This reserve has to provide a manual 
response within ten minutes of the dispatcher’s signal. The reserve has to be capable of 
operating until the dispatcher directs it to stop. As with the regulation obligation, also the 
synchronized reserve obligation can be fulfilled in a number of ways. [PJM, 2010] 
An LSE can own Tier 1 resources and use these to fulfil its obligation. Tier 1 resources are so-
called “economic” resources; they are partially loaded units online following economic 
dispatch and able to increase output in ten minutes in response to a spinning event. Aside 
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from the synchronized reserve market clearing price, these reserves also get special Tier 1 
credits.  
Tier 2 resources are those that are online, but operating at a point deviating from economic 
dispatch. If Tier 1 resources are enough to meet the reserve requirement, no Tier 2 will be 
assigned, and the clearing price for it will be zero. Normally Tier 2 reserves get the 
synchronized reserve market clearing price, $/MW. [PJM, 2010]  
If an entity with a synchronized reserve obligation does not have own resources, then it can 
purchase them from the synchronized reserve market. Also if an entity is not capable of 
fulfilling its entire obligation using its own reserves, it has to buy the rest from the market. 
They have to pay the market clearing price and their share of opportunity cots as well as 
Tier 1 credits. Those who provide generation to the market are compensated the higher of 
the market clearing price and their merit order price. The final option to fulfil the 
synchronized reserve obligation is to enter into bilateral agreements with other market 
participants. The clearing of the synchronized reserve market is a joint optimization 
between the regulation and synchronized reserves, where the goal is to minimise the total 
cost of producing power. The clearing price is determined from bid plus opportunity cost of 
Tier 2 resources committed to meet the reserve requirement. [PJM, 2010] 
Demand response can take part in both regulation and synchronized reserve, but it is 
limited to 25 percent of the each of the reserve requirements of the entire area. The 
opportunity cost for demand response is also always assumed to be zero. Further, when 
synchronized reserve is needed units that are providing regulation can be taken off 
regulation to provide synchronized reserve for a maximum of 20 minutes.  [PJM, 2010] 
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Aside from regulation and synchronized reserves, PJM has also quick-start reserves. During 
the research undertaken for this thesis, it was not possible to find out all of their details, like 
whether there is a separate market of obligation for these reserves. Nevertheless, the quick-
start reserves are not synchronized to the system. They are specifically requested by PJM, if 
needed in addition to synchronized reserve, and their generation is available within ten 
minutes. This reserve is generally provided by run-of-river hydro, pumped hydro, 
combustion turbines, or diesel type units. [PJM, 2010 (2)] 
The final reserve obligation in PJM is for supplemental reserves. These are reserves that do 
not need to be synchronized to the system, are requested by PJM when needed, and 
provide their full response within 10 to 30 minutes. Each LSE’s obligation is equal to the 
LSE’s load ration share of the total PJM RTO requirement of this reserve. An LSE can fulfil its 
obligation in the three ways familiar from above; it can self-schedule its own resources, it 
can enter into bilateral agreements with other market players, or it can use the 
supplemental reserve market to purchase the required amount of reserve. [PJM, 2007] 
Those reserves that self-schedule are paid the supplemental reserve market clearing price of 
dollars per MWh, in bilateral arrangements payments are agreed between the parties. The 
supplemental reserve market is cleared in a joint optimisation of the day-ahead market, 
with a separate price for each hour. Those that purchase their reserve from the 
supplemental reserve market have to pay the clearing price for the reserves times the 
amount of MW they purchased, and in addition their share of those costs that the providers 
of supplemental reserve were unable to cover by the market clearing price alone. The 
clearing price equals the merit order price of the most expensive unit assigned generation. 
The providers of generation are paid the higher of the market clearing price, or their 
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respective merit order price. Supplemental reserve capacity is in general provided by 
unsynchronized hydro, industrial combustion turbines, jet engine turbines, combined cycle, 
and diesels. It can also be provided by synchronized generation that is operating at a point 
deviating from economic dispatch, or by load resources. [PJM, 2007] 
The PJM capacity market is designed to ensure the adequate availability of resources that 
can be called upon to ensure the reliability of the grid. The capacity market is formed by two 
parts: the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) and Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR). These are 
alternatives, and their difference is in that in RPM the TSO procures capacity on behalf of 
LSEs in order to fulfil load obligations that are not satisfied through LSE self-supply, and FRR 
is used by those LSEs that opt not to take part in RPM, but instead to obtain the capacity to 
satisfy their load obligation themselves. RPM and the capacity market in general, are meant 
to ensure long-term adequacy and competitively priced energy, and to take into 
consideration as well as quantify both the locational and operational value of capacity. The 
capacity market is also designed to produce forward investment signals. The capacity 
resources acquired through RPM include both existing and planned generation resources, 
existing and planned demand resources, as well as energy efficiency resources. [PJM, 2011] 
RPM is based on auctions, the first of which takes place three years before delivery year, 
and is called the Base Residual Auction. Here the main part of the resource commitments to 
meet the peak load three years in the future is obtained. After this, there are further 
auctions that enable refining of the resource commitments and the procuring of more 
resources. The cost of procuring the capacity through these auctions is allocated to the load 
serving entities through a locational reliability charge. In the basic scenario, the other 
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auctions are at 20, 10, and three months prior to delivery year, but there is also the 
possibility of holding one more auction at any time prior to delivery year. [PJM, 2011] 
FRR is the alternative to those LSEs that do not want to take part in RPM. In essence, this 
means that the LSE will send a fixed capacity plant to PJM, and thus meet a fixed resource 
requirement, whereas in RPM the resource requirement is variable. An LSE that chooses FRR 
does not pay the locational reliability charge, but neither does he get the market clearing 
price for the resources he includes in the plan that the resource providers in the RPM model 
get. [PJM, 2011] 
6.2 Frequency control instruments – some general points 
All power systems have to take care of frequency control one way or another. However, it is 
not nearly always the case that there is an open market for the frequency control reserves. 
Often the trade is based on bilateral agreements.  
There are three separate parts in power markets; generation, transmission, and distribution. 
In the case of a monopoly, all of these are owned and operated by a single market 
participant; a company, or a state. Often the progress towards a competitive market starts 
with the formation of separate distribution companies, with generation and transmission 
being left to one or a few large, many times state-owned, utilities. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
This situation is not much different from a total monopoly, as the utilities tend to own the 
transmission system and can thus control the power sold through it for example by using 
large transmission tariffs. In such a system, there is not a whole lot of competition, and thus 
planning an “optimal system” is relatively easy. This is because without competition there is 
no risk of electricity contracts being given to someone else, and thus little risk in making 
even large investments in capacity. That being said, the difference between a system with 
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virtually no competition that is well planned and a totally competitive system can be 
marginal and there is no way of saying with absolute certainty whether the liberalisation of 
power markets is actually better for the power customer. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
However, if the desire is to make a power market totally competitive, the next stage is to 
separate also generation and transmission. Customers are allowed to choose between 
several different suppliers. In these unbundled markets, electricity generation is the 
responsibility of separate generation companies, transmission is the responsibility of a 
transmission system operator, and distribution that of separate distribution companies. 
[Vuorinen, 2009] 
After a power market has proceeded this far, there can be a (natural) push to build a free 
market also for ancillary services. In a way, this completes the transition to a market that is 
entirely free, open, and competitive. Ancillary services can be defined as “services that 
should be offered as separate products form transmission services”. These include 
scheduling, system control, dispatching, reactive supply, voltage control, regulation, 
frequency response, imbalance, spinning reserves, and supplementary reserves. [Vuorinen, 
2009] 
There are differences between the specific implementation of ancillary service and the in 
this thesis examined frequency control markets in different countries, although as both 
Poland and Denmark are members of ENTSO-E, and as such required to follow the same 
policy when it comes to frequency control, the countries chosen as cases for this thesis do 
perhaps not highlight the differences so well in spite of the very different system in use in 
PJM. However, the dimensions that are essential for a player wishing to enter a frequency 
control market are almost always the same. One needs to be aware of the required 
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response time, whether the response needs to be automatic or manual, how long the 
response must last, and how the response is compensated. Although it is of course essential 
to know many other more practical things, like how the trading is done, the dimensions 
mentioned above will determine whether a participant is capable of providing the service 
and whether it will be lucrative for them.  
6.3 Capacity adequacy instruments – some general points 
On liberalised markets, or energy-only markets, the biggest problem is usually the fact that 
maintaining peaking and reserve capacity is not profitable, if they only get paid for the 
energy generated during the few peak hours annually. On the traditional electricity markets 
of vertically integrated utilities and next to zero competition, adequacy of capacity wasn’t 
most often even an issue. This is because there was little risk of utilities not being able to 
sell enough electricity to cover their costs, and because there also often were capacity fees 
in place for covering the capacity costs. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
 
Figure 5 Load duration curve of Cyprus to illustrate peak hours [Cyprus Transmission System 
Operator webpage]  
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The liberalisation of markets has led to the fact that the capacity costs of peaking and 
reserve plants are paid only if there actually is a deficit of power annually. This means that 
the risk in building these plants is very high, and without a separate scheme to motivate the 
building of adequate capacity to meet the power demand at any time, it will probably not 
be built. Thus it is necessary to have some kind of obligation requiring utilities to either build 
or hire new capacity. It is also necessary from the consumer point of view; for the energy-
only market to cover the costs of peaking plants, the price of power during the peak hours 
would have to be unacceptably high, especially if the peak is relatively thin like in the figure 
above. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
There are a couple of ways to handle this capacity conundrum. For example in the UK, there 
was in use a capacity pricing system based on value of lost load (VOLL) until the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) liberalisation phase. In this model, capacity was 
priced according to a theoretical calculation of the VOLL. Generators were paid per MW or 
based on the availability of capacity. These payments were collected from the customers. 
The problem with this system was in the evaluation of the loss of load probability (LOLP). 
Also, the system was relatively easy to manipulate; when a plant operator informed the 
market that a plant was not available, the price of capacity went up. This was one of the 
factors behind the decision to change the UK system to NETA. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
Another option to tackle the capacity adequacy issue is to create installed capacity 
obligations (ICAP) and separate capacity markets. This solution is in use in PJM and New 
England power systems. The ICAP obligations require market participants to have enough 
installed capacity to meet forecasted peak loads. If an LSE does not own or cannot hire 
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enough to cover its obligation, it has to buy the capacity from the market. It is also possible 
to have obligations for available capacity (ACAP), instead of installed. [Vuorinen, 2009] 
In the UK there is at present another electricity market reform underway, in the 
consultation phase and with plans to implement after 2012. In this reform, the goal is to 
“achieve secure, low carbon, affordable electricity”. By 2020, UK will have to replace at least 
a quarter of its current installed capacity as it is ageing and unlikely to meet environmental 
requirements, and this replacement has to be done at the least possible cost to consumers. 
The plan to tackle this goal has four points: carbon price support, emissions performance 
standard, long term contracts for low carbon generation, and a “targeted capacity 
mechanism”. The goal of this capacity mechanism is to lower the investment cost associated 
with building new capacity, thus reducing the cost of capital, which in turn should result in 
more investment from both existing and new investors. The ultimate result is hoped to be 
enough capacity to meet the demand at all times, and this at the lowest possible cost to 
consumers. At this point it is not yet clear, what the design of the mechanism is going to 
look like more specifically. [Brearley, 2010] 
As another example, in Russia there is also a power sector reform underway. The reasons 
for the reform are the same that induced many countries with vertically integrated, state-
controlled monopolies to reform their power sectors in the 1990s: “ageing infrastructure, 
large distribution losses, very low retail tariffs, inefficient management, and increasing 
tightness of supply”. The new wholesale electricity market is “gradually taking shape”, and it 
will include separate markets for electric energy and capacity. The idea is that the electric 
energy market would cover the operating costs of power generation, and the capacity 
market would cover the fixed operation costs. The capacity market’s purpose is to 
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guarantee power generators an income independent of energy price fluctuations. Anyone 
taking part in the wholesale market has to buy both power and capacity. The basic principle 
is that generators offer capacity in a monthly uniform price auction, where the system 
operator accepts bids starting with the lowest priced ones. [Solanko, 2011] 
It must be said that as the Russian capacity market is in reality heavily regulated, and thus its 
ability to produce correct market signals can be put into question. For instance, all the 
generating companies already have legally binding capacity obligations for the period of 
2008 to 2012. Additionally, all new capacity built after 2006 and included in the general plan 
of the power sector get capacity payments, the value of which is determined in capacity 
delivery agreements. And the new capacity that is not included in the general plan cannot 
even take part in the capacity market. All of this means that the ability of the capacity prices 
to truly produce new investment is highly questionable, and that only old and existing 
capacity ends up being traded on the market. Finally, authorities can introduce price caps on 
the capacity market if they wish. [Solanko, 2011] 
Though the Russian capacity market seems to rely more on regulation than on market 
forces, perhaps it serves to demonstrate that designing a well-functioning capacity market is 
not a small task. [Solanko, 2011] This might be one of the reasons that in spite of the many 
alternative ways to go about it, in most countries and power systems there is at present no 
separate capacity market. The countries and areas cited as examples are at present the 
exception, not the rule. This is probably likely to change in the future, as more and more 
countries start to open their power sectors to form liberalised markets and have to face the 
inability of the free market to provide capacity adequacy.  
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However, today many developing countries, and others without a free market, still use 
power purchase agreements (PPA) for the task. In essence, a PPA is a legal contract between 
a power producer and a buyer. The seller is often an independent power producer (IPP). The 
contract is most often formed for a limited time period, and can include the purchase of just 
power or also capacity and even ancillary services. Brazil is an example of a country that 
uses PPAs.    
Of the case areas in this thesis, only PJM has a functioning capacity market. Thus, it is not 
possible to draw any far-reaching consequences that one could generalize. Denmark and 
Poland have capacity instruments that reward certain types of generation. These systems 
make it more viable to build renewable generation that perhaps without them would be 
unprofitable. In Poland especially, the certificates function as a sort of insurance that it is 
safe to invest in generation at all, even though they have raised certain generation types 
above others by giving them more compensation.  
Also, there aren’t even that many countries in the world at present that have had to face 
the capacity issue brought on by free energy markets. This means that any common 
methods of handling the situation have not been established yet, which makes 
generalisations difficult. The mechanisms used vary a lot there is no established standard 
yet. 
A market player, or producer, wishing to enter a market or build new generation relying on 
support from certificates, needs to know three things. First, how long the support will be 
available. This is because if the certificates or other support are essential in making the 
project financially viable, and without them it might lead to losses, then the player has to be 
able to rely on the support coming for a certain period of time. Another, related, concern is 
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how large the support will be, and how often the level of support will change. If the 
compensation were to change without warning, and at irregular intervals to boot, it would 
be impossible to base investment decisions on it. The third essential thing to know is for 
how much of the power sold certificates must be bought. These three apply for feed-in-
tariffs as well as certificates and capacity payments.   
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7 Findings 
The first clear finding, or result, of this thesis is that the information required to do a survey 
such as this one has not been gathered together before. There are no global studies on 
ancillary services and capacity adequacy from the perspective of this thesis. This means that 
in order for one to get a good picture of the different ways of organising ancillary services 
and trading them, it is to investigate one country or trading area at a time. At least for the 
countries featured as cases in this thesis this meant that it was necessary to delve into 
detailed policy documents and TSO websites in order to understand the systems of the 
countries.    
Also an important finding is that it was possible by combining concepts and ideas from 
different sources to establish a framework for power system needs and the instruments 
used to respond to them. The needs were categorised into three categories in chapter 
three: physical operation, network level, and policy level. All of these levels are of course 
ultimately inextricably linked to the physical operation of the system, but their difference is 
in the scope of focus. The needs that come from the policy level are concerned for example 
with the benefit of the whole society or country, while the network level considers the grid 
as a whole, and the physical operation level concentrates on specific, momentary actions.  
On the physical operation level, the needs are frequency and voltage stability, as well as 
power quality. The network level gives rise to needs for transmission security, economic 
dispatch, imbalance management, and procedures for handling emergencies and black 
starts. The policy level needs include capacity adequacy, energy efficiency, methods to o 
guide the capacity mix and climate change mitigation. 
92 
 
A framework was established for the instruments used to respond to these needs as well. 
This was done in chapter four, and the categories of the framework are frequency control, 
capacity, coordination and operation, as well as system backup and restoration. This 
framework was adapted from Raineri et al 2006, with the additional category of capacity.  
To take care of frequency control, reserves of different types and demand response are 
used. The capacity category includes different ways to ensure adequacy of capacity, and to 
guide the capacity mix. Coordination and operation refers to voltage control, imbalance 
settlement, nodal marginal pricing, and transmission capacity allocation. The final category 
of system backup and restoration contains emergency services and black start capability.  
Another finding is that the framework established for the instruments works quite well for 
looking at different countries’ power systems. That is, it seems to function satisfactorily as a 
guide to finding and recognizing the different elements of a power system, at least in terms 
of frequency control and capacity. Although the instruments in individual countries may not 
be divided in exactly the same manner as in the framework, it seems to be possible to use 
the framework for detecting them. 
After generation, transmission, and distribution have been unbundled, the next step on the 
way towards a truly competitive market can often be the creation of an ancillary services 
market. Although the ancillary services and frequency control markets of different countries 
vary in how they are organized, the basic parameters that a player needs to be aware of 
when entering the market were found to often be the same ones. These are the dimensions 
that are most important in defining the service. In terms of frequency control, the most 
essential dimensions are the required response time, whether the response needs to be 
automatic or manual, how long it has to be possible to maintain the response, and how the 
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service is compensated. Of course there are many other practical dimensions that are 
important, like how the trading is done, but those mentioned determine whether providing 
the service is possible and lucrative for a market player.  
After the energy market has been liberalised, there can often arise a problem with the 
adequacy of capacity. This is because on pure energy-only markets, there are no payments 
for capacity, and reserve and peaking plants are only able to cover their costs if there are a 
sufficient number of peak hours or hours during which there is a power deficit annually. This 
means that the risk in building capacity becomes a lot higher than in regulated markets, and 
it is most likely necessary to have some separate mechanism to encourage its building. 
There are several methods to handle the capacity issue, as established in chapter six. These 
include VOLL-pricing, ACAP or ICAP payments, and the creation of a capacity market. Many 
countries without free markets or with regulated markets use PPAs to guarantee capacity. 
Of the case countries, only PJM had a functioning capacity market, so to generalise based on 
that what the essential dimensions of capacity markets are, would be difficult. And because 
not that many countries in the world have yet had to face the capacity issue brought on by 
free markets, there is not a whole lot of experience of capacity markets in general, and no 
standard or established ways of organizing one yet.  
However, both Denmark and Poland have capacity instruments that make it more profitable 
to build certain types of generation, in Denmark this is the PSO and in Poland the 
certificates, as described in chapter 6. Based on examining these instruments, as well as the 
PJM capacity market, it was found that a player who wants to build generation or enter a 
market relying on support from certificates or capacity payments needs to be aware of a 
few key dimensions. First, he needs to know how long the support will be available. Second, 
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it he needs to know what the size of the support will be and how often it will change. The 
third crucial dimension in terms of certificates especially is how large the volume of the 
certificates is in the area; for how much of the power sold must certificates be bought. 
These dimensions determine, whether the support level offered is high enough, and stable 
enough, and whether it will be forthcoming for long enough to make investment profitable.   
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8 Conclusions 
The starting point of the whole thesis was that the energy-only market alone is not enough 
for the operation of the system, and that if the market is used for trading solely energy 
there is a need for separate mechanisms to take care of the other needs on the physical 
operation, network, and policy levels.  As presented in the precious chapter, the focus of 
this thesis became to build a framework for these mechanisms or instruments.  
There appear to be three reasons why the energy-only market alone cannot delier. First, on 
open energy markets nobody is really able to take care of the coordination of the whole 
system, of overseeing everything needed to keep it going strong. True, the system operator 
is most often charged with this responsibility but in most cases has limited ability to carry it 
out. This is due to many reasons; one major reason being that the system operator is most 
often not even allowed to own the generation that would be needed for the continuous 
balancing of the system. 
The second reason something in addition to the energy-only market is required is that as 
established in chapter two, the nature of the deregulated market is such that bilateral 
contracts cannot be enforced in real time, as it is at present not possible to control the flow 
of power to a particular customer or from a particular producer in real time. This means that 
the inability of one supplier to supply can in theory topple the whole system, and that the 
system operator has to function as the default supplier.   
Third, in the short term both supply and demand are to a certain degree inelastic. There is at 
present little real-time metering in use, and customers don’t usually even see the real-time 
price for electricity, let alone change their consumption accordingly. Also supply can only 
react up to the amount of available capacity, after which it becomes inelastic. And it is not 
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even desirable to have to operate near the area where the supply becomes inelastic, as 
there both prices and associated risks to producers and consumers become very high.   
When it comes to the ancillary services, the research undertaken and reported in chapters 
five and six implies that it seems not to matter so much how the practical details of it like 
the number of reserve types or division of response times are organized, so long as the 
requirement for frequency stability is fulfilled and balance achieved.  
For example, the exact amount of time after which the secondary reserve replaces the 
primary reserve, or the amount of reserve types are secondary considerations compared to 
the frequency being restored. This leads one to believe that the ancillary service market is 
relatively easy to arrange or set up; the system operator just uses some separate market 
mechanism, either a market or bilateral arrangements, to buy the required services. The 
only issue is to reimburse the producers for the opportunity cost of not being able to sell to 
the market, of lost production.   
The conclusion that the ancillary market is relatively easy to arrange, or that it does not so 
much matter how the practical details are arranged, of course only applies if there is enough 
capacity in the system. However, if there is not enough capacity, ancillary services cannot be 
maintained. An example of this is India; there the capacity deficit is such that regular power 
cuts are the norm. Of course if there is not sufficient capacity, the energy-only market will 
not function smoothly either. This is true especially if the ancillary and energy-only markets 
use a common capacity pool for bidding.  
In general, bidding on both ancillary and energy-only markets is based on short term 
marginal costs and plants are assigned operation according to their merit order price. This 
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means that the market price is determined according to the marginal costs of the most 
expensive plant assigned operation. Only those plants, for which the market price is higher 
than their marginal costs are able to cover their costs and even make a profit. Thus, the 
most expensive plants that define the price don’t get any profit. Additionally, they are 
typically in operation for only a few peak hours during the year, which makes it even more 
difficult for them to cover their fixed costs let alone be profitable investments.  
Although it is in theory possible, as discussed earlier, in practice an open market cannot in 
the long term guarantee capacity adequacy through the energy-only market alone, if the 
load duration curve has a relatively thin peak. This is because it would lead to unacceptable 
price peaks; the price would have to be unreasonably high during the few peak hours to 
cover generation costs. This would be a big risk for both producers and consumers. For 
consumers the risk is that these peak prices would be realized, for producers the risk is the 
opposite; that they would not be realised and that production costs would not be covered. 
The size of the risk would lead to unacceptably high risk premiums. Thus, one can presume 
that the issue of capacity adequacy will not be solved in an open market environment 
without a separate mechanism.  
There are several mechanisms for tackling the capacity adequacy issue; from creating a full-
blown capacity market to using different kinds of capacity payments or obligations, or 
indirect means like certificates that favour and encourage the building of one type of 
capacity over another. Since the liberalisation of power markets is a relatively new 
phenomenon, there are not many countries or areas in the world that have had to deal with 
the inadequacy of capacity brought on by the free market. Thus, there is not a lot of 
experience yet in the world with capacity markets. This is reflected in the fact that in this 
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thesis, the only case area with a functioning capacity market was PJM. Denmark and Poland 
each have mechanisms that prefer certain type of capacity over others, but there is no 
actual capacity market or capacity obligations or payments in either one of them. 
The survey undertaken for this thesis also gave some insight into a couple of major points 
that ought to be considered when designing market instruments to a system. The first one 
of these is that the instruments implemented actually function together. For example, if one 
is planning a capacity payment, it should be taken into consideration what else has been 
done to intervene on the market, and that these different support mechanisms do not 
contradict one another.  
A second point is the division of responsibility and risk between the TSOs and single market 
players; how much responsibility should the TSO carry and what should be common 
responsibility, what the individual market players’. There are a number of ways to transfer 
responsibility from one party to another. One example is nodal marginal pricing; when every 
node has its own price, then the cost of congestion management fall onto single consumers 
and producers. This is different from the current situation e.g. in Finland, where there is 
only one area price and if ancillary services have to be used somewhere everyone in the 
whole country pays the higher price. If it is not possible due to congestion to transfer 
electricity to a certain area or consumer, then the Finnish TSO shoulders the costs of using 
the reserves, the costs are “socialized” into the power price of all consumers. With nodal 
marginal pricing, however, the costs are transferred directly to the consumers in the 
affected area, affecting only their power price.  
Another way of moving the line of responsibility between the TSO and consumers and 
producers is the length of the operating period, the time period that is the basic unit of the 
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energy market. For example in the Nordic countries, the operation period is now 60 
minutes, which means that while producers have to plan their production schedules at the 
resolution of one hour, the TSO is responsible for guaranteeing balance within the hour. If 
the operation hour were shorter, then the responsibility would lie more with the producers; 
they would have to send production schedules for say 15 minutes periods, and be held 
accountable to them. This would mean that they would also have to make sure they have or 
purchase the requisite reserves to manage balance, to remain within their reported 
operation. 
Another, related, question is what to include in the market, what not? As an example; in 
terms of reserves this division is visible in which reserves are bought using the open market, 
in many cases primary, secondary, and tertiary, and which ones are outside of the market, 
emergency reserves that are never actually traded but only used in case of large system 
disturbances. Here one has to face the inevitable question of whether it is sensible in the 
first place for the SO to have to pay for plants that stand cold most of the time and cannot 
operate on the free market. This leads to the question of who actually should have the 
capacity and which mechanism should be used to acquire it.   
A third issue when designing market instruments for frequency control and capacity 
adequacy is whether the instrument will be taking care of a problem or issue that already 
exists or whether it will be more of a pre-emptive measure. It is probably most common 
that there is some problem that needs to be addressed, for example the creation of the 
capacity mechanisms in Spain and Russia were responses to capacity inadequacy. An 
example of a pre-emptive measure is the ongoing process to form a capacity market to the 
UK and Poland in order to prevent capacity running out. 
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A major point to consider is also how the different markets are connected to each other, for 
example the energy market and the capacity market. Should the capacity market or 
obligations be made such that they only influence or have requirements for the amount of 
capacity? And leave the determination of the capacity type to the energy market? Or should 
the capacity market in and of itself already take care of the selection of the type of capacity, 
for instance by favouring or rewarding certain types of capacity? These are questions with 
far-reaching consequences, and answering them is certainly not possible based on the 
research carried out for this thesis. However, in the design of markets they cannot or at 
least should not be ignored.         
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9 Discussion 
It turned out that the attempt to build a framework for ancillary services was a very relevant 
one. Although the initial idea was to find such a framework ready, and to use it to classify 
different countries’ market instruments and to display the variation in them, it quickly 
became clear that no such frameworks could be found and the direction of the research 
shifted.  
The case areas were selected for level of general interest. PJM and Denmark were chosen 
due to their systems being quite advanced with many components and were thought to 
show good variation. Poland was chosen as an example of a country whose power market is 
just developing. However, when considering the goal of this thesis to highlight as many 
different market instruments as possible, the better way to select the areas could have been 
to look at whether they have interesting mechanisms for taking care of frequency control 
and capacity, not so much whether their whole system or market is interesting. This could 
have produced a better understanding of the variation in especially the methods of taking 
care of capacity adequacy.  
As there was very limited general level information or research on these subjects from this 
viewpoint, it was necessary to resort to reading through policy documents and TSO reports. 
Additionally, it was not an easy task to find interviewees with broad knowledge of the area. 
These together meant that it was time consuming to dig for information, and easy to get 
bogged down with details. Thus, it would require a much larger study with a lot longer time 
to do it to get to understand all the different options, or even the case markets completely. 
The research done for this thesis demonstrated clearly that this is an area with a lot of 
possibilities for further research. It would be easy to delve into a single country, or market 
area, and make a thesis or two from that alone.   
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A very interesting direction to go in further research would be to look into the theory of 
electricity markets. As there were no general descriptions of what mechanisms exist, this 
thesis is out of necessity a descriptive one. But one way to go deeper into this subject would 
be look at what the theory of economics says about electricity markets. What would be the 
ideal way to arrange capacity and ancillary markets according to economic theory, what 
should work best? And then to contrast this with what exists in reality, how it really goes. 
And then to try to synthesize and find an arrangement that is a combination of the best of 
both worlds.   
Due to the extensive amount of research required, it was chosen to limit this thesis to 
include only frequency control and capacity adequacy in more detail. Of course, one could 
argue that the division between frequency control and system backup and restoration is 
artificial but it was necessary in order to complete this work. The same goes for capacity 
adequacy; based on this study it is really not possible to say what are all of the elements 
that in truth affect how the capacity is determined in a country or area. Further, it is most 
likely not possible to make broad generalisations of the organisation of frequency control or 
capacity instruments based on the few cases included in this thesis. 
In order to draw the conclusions in the previous chapter with absolute certainty, it would be 
necessary to examine what economics has to say, to review more countries as cases, and to 
do these reviews in more detail. As already stated above, it was necessary in this thesis to 
approach the subject though the viewpoint of the instruments, as there was no framework 
for them ready, or other general level information. The next stage would be to use the 
framework to examine the questions presented in the conclusions chapter.   
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